Heeding Heidegger's Way: Questions of the Work of Art

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ABSTRACT
Martin Heidegger says, "Questioning builds a way ... The way is a way of thinking". Through Heidegger's 'way' of disclosing questions in/on the work of art, technology and Being, this paper brings Heidegger's thought into proximity with art and education. It considers dominant representational practices by which these things are 'known' in the world of metaphysical understandings. If the question of being is a question concerning truth in Heidegger's philosophical project, then what relation does this have to the work of art, and why 'art'; and what might these questions reveal about subject-object relations in our 'knowing' of the world and being? With The Scream (Munch, 1893) as a starting point, this paper considers the work of art in terms of media and art historical representations; and then, via Heidegger's questioning, it reflects on the way 'truth' as a constellation may be 'pictured' in the world and revealed through the work of art. Public and disciplinary discourses of art and interpretation are brought forward as a way of working through Heidegger's project concerning the 'problem' of metaphysics and 'sickness' of modernity. Attempting to 'follow the movement of showing' through opening spaces of 'disclosure' in the work of art and education, the paper heeds Heidegger's 'way' as it thinks through poiesis and techne as modes of being in and with the world.

The work of art, an event and a disclosure

I was walking along a path with two friends
the sun was setting
I felt a breath of melancholy.
Suddenly the sky turned blood-red
I stopped and leant against the railing,
Deathly tired
Looking out across flaming clouds that hung
Like blood and a sword over the
Deep blue fjord and town.
My friends walked on - I stood there
Trembling with anxiety.
And I felt a great infinite scream
Pass through nature.
(Edvard Munch, in Wood, 1992: 96)

Edvard Munch and *The Scream* (1893) has just hit the headlines. ‘Outrage at ease of Scream theft’ (*The New Zealand Herald*, Tuesday 24 August, 2004: B 1) draws us into the account of yet another art heist from a public museum. "No alarms rang as the robbers threatened a security guard with a gun, forced people to lie down, and removed the painting, worth about $80 million". In the report the work of art is described (represented/ categorised) as "one of art's best-known treasures"; "one of the most instantly recognisable images in art"; one of "four versions of *The Scream* which was part of a series called *The Frieze of Life*"; a "howling figure"; and "the world's most famous and most frequently reproduced painting". What is interesting in this account is that the work of art as we know it, as art, is not the major interest of the report. In six columns of reportage there are only a few scattered references to 'the art' itself (but what is 'the art'?) with the main attention devoted to the event as an object of examination and representation, which includes an account of the poor security of the gallery and humiliation of the Oslo gallery custodians ('the ease with which they took [the painting] was embarrassing in the extreme'); the language (Norwegian) the thieves spoke during the robbery and where the getaway car and the smashed frame were found (identification clues); some quantifiable information such as the painting's worth ("about $80 million") and comparative visitor statistics at the Munch Museum ("more than four million visitors"); and in the interests of activating the popular imagination, the curious mix of personnel involved in solving the mystery of a previous theft of *The Scream* (National Gallery, February, 1994) - "a Scotland Yard detective, a top football player [in] a sting operation as audacious as the original theft" - bringing sting, theft, and audacity into correspondence with each other to comprise the object of interest.

What these phrases and references represent to us is a world of 'art' that has become a world of something else that is not art, and yet ... this starts to be perplexing. If it is not 'art', but 'event', what is the event-world that this entity called art inhabits and gathers around itself? From what has been written of the robbery, perhaps it is true that "we get the picture". But in "The Age of the World Picture" Heidegger asks (1977a: 129), "What does 'picture' mean?" He then answers his own question with, "'Picture' here does not mean some imitation, but rather what sounds forth in the colloquial expression - 'We get the picture' (literally, we are in the picture) concerning something". Heidegger's thinking on 'world picture' reveals that "representation" is at work here - "what is, is set before us, is represented to us", but also "what is stands before us - in all that belongs to it and all that stands together in it- as a system". So the circles are widening here, to include systems in the world, events of thought and perception. We, as the perceivers, are brought into the moment of perception as we "get the picture". It "throbs with being acquainted with something, with being equipped - and prepared for it". So we are in a world of preparedness as we "set in place" the "picture" that we say we get.

Reading further, we find that Heidegger is taking us beyond "representation" as "the character of subjective perception" (1977b: 131) to see "the one who - in company with itself - gathered towards presencing, by that which opens itself" and he takes the question of language back to the ancient Greeks with, "in order to fulfill his essence, Greek man must gather (legein) and save (sōzein), catch up and preserve, what opens itself in its openness and he must remain exposed (aletheuein) to all its sundering co fusions" (131). If the 'picture' that we get in the event of an art heist is represented to us via the language of the news media, then its 'object-being' may be separating us from a gathering "towards presencing".

This discussion has started with a work of art, an event and a discourse. The way we are accessing these three 'things' is by writing through a 'discourse event'. In the 'picture' of this discussion there is a work of art named *The Scream* that has been variously described in a range of
genres. In a moment’s event (23/8/04), *The Scream* has been represented in a technological age of heightened informational activity (21st century), in a named location (Oslo, Norway), as an object in a world of locatable categories and events, a thing with significant capital value, that should have been well-secured and was not, that has caused embarrassment to others who were looking after it; a thing that re-inscribes public interest and talk, and signifies the general interest people have in technologically inscribed things/events in the world. That is the ‘picture’ that we apparently get here - *The Scream* as a rationally (dis)ordered, technologised event and we are placed in a rationally ordered relationship to it through the process of linguistic and visual representation of its ‘object-being’.

**Public talk, language and Being**

*The Scream* as a ‘work’, an aesthetic object, a painting, one hundred years old, has been presented in different ways in discourses of art history, and publicly, by diverse people in diverse settings, as a metaphor of modern life. "We get the picture", they say, and generally seem to agree. This discussion will address the question of ‘modern life’ and its apparent ‘destitution’ shortly as it works its way back towards the work of art. However, first let us consider this: what is the implication “of ‘publicly’ in the way Munch’s work of art may be known? Heidegger’s *Ontology* - The Hermeneutics of Facticity (Heidegger, 1999a) may throw some light on this question.

In his Lecture Course from the Summer Semester of 1923 at Marburg University, where he taught from 1923 to 1928, Heidegger (1999a: 24-27) addresses the question of “Faticity as the being-there of Dasein in the awhileness of temporal particularity. The ‘today’”(Translator’s footnote #1: “H’s heading: ‘Hermeneutics of the Situation’”) (24). In this section Heidegger (25) draws the reader into a consideration of the way that “[t]he being-there of Dasein has its open space of *publicness* and its ways of seeing there. It moves (a basic phenomenon) around a definite mode of discourse about itself: talk (technical term)” (Heidegger’s emphasis).

How is it that *The Scream* can be known in the sorts of terms that are publicly agreed (by "everyone")? Heidegger (26) speaks of "publicness" in relation to being:

publicness is the mode of being of the ‘every-one’: everyone says that ..., everyone has heard that ...
everyone tells it like ..., everyone thinks that ..., everyone expects that ..., everyone is in favor of...
The talk in circulation belongs to no one, no one takes responsibility for it, everyone has said it.

Thus "publicness" is not an ‘out-there’ objective situation when *Dasein* as a “temporal particularity” (24) is considered. Rather "publicness" is a particular "mode of being"; and in that "mode of being" *Dasein* is "being-interpreted in the today" (26). Heidegger is drawing us into:

the awhileness of temporal particularity is the today- in each case whiling, tarrying for a while, in the present, in each case our own present. (Dasein as historical Dasein, its present. Being 'in' the world, being lived from out of the world - the present - everyday.) (Heidegger, 1999a: 24).

It may seem that this discussion is getting sidetracked into an interpretive analysis of Heidegger’s *Dasein (there/here-Being; to be there; being there)* in its present-ness, rather than talking about the work of art in question, or the question of ‘modern life’ and its apparent ‘destitution’. However, it is attempting to show Heidegger’s fundamental and enduring concerns for his philosophy of Being and his profound questioning of the forgetting of the question of Being in Western metaphysics. Such forgetting is an inscribed practice via philosophy’s post-Cartesian emphasis on epistemology and the Western world’s constructions of causality. For Heidegger, any questions to do with truth, reality and being are already infused with deeply entrenched ontological pre-suppositions in Western thought, to which he returns again and again as fundamental flaws of transcendental idealism, technological determinism, and teleological thinking/being. In ‘productionist metaphysics’ the resources of thinking and things (technological) become as "standing-reserve" (Heidegger, 1977a: 17) to be stored-up for later possible use. But even as we store-up, the possible
becomes "standing-reserve" for later capitalisation. Thus the world and its entities (even entities of thought) are objectified for our use and separated endlessly from the time of being. Thus the 'Being' is represented as the Being-of-knowledge, the Being-of-belief, the a priori Being-of-presence. Heidegger turns towards the Being of the being in time, m the temporality of our existence, and speaks through a new language of possibility of the b/Being that has not been thought prior to the act of thinking.

Here is a critical spirit; a "way" of working towards some sort of "disclosure" through the very act of language with all its paradoxes and poetics, as a "gathering" of the world, a "clearing of being", a "revealing" of the world in relation to one's death and the finitude of being-in-the-world. In his writing, Heidegger seeks language that displaces entrenched propositions and philosophical assumptions, "invent[ing] his own technical terminology" (Roberts, 1966: 147), which many readers find difficult if not alienating. However, working through this language with its particularities and poiesis can be an illuminating experience. As Otto Poggeler put it (1963), "Heidegger's thought must be understood as a way. ... Heidegger has always understood his thinking as going along a way ... into the neighbourhood of Being" (cited in Krell, 1999: 31).

The discussions from the Marburg seminar (1923) are pre-Being and Time (Heidegger's magnum opus of 1927) and they reveal how his thinking on the central question of 'being' (Sein) has been, since the Greeks, through Medieval scholasticism, and the Western Enlightenment, ill-matched with the question of time. By asking questions of the being of Being, Heidegger's engagement with ontology is a 'fundamental ontology' that seeks to get underneath the questions posed by specific ontologies of history or nature. Heidegger's Dasein is not of biological origin, nor of consciousness; not contingent nor conditional; not pre-determined in essence nor rationality; not confined to time or place; but is in and of time and place, a disclosing thing in the world - "from the outset a question concerning truth, understood not as the correspondence of propositions to states of affairs, but as disclosure, unconcealment, and what Heidegger later called 'the clearing of being', die Lichtung des Seins"(Urmson and Rée, 1995: 129).

Hermeneutical explication in the today

In his early lectures (1923), Heidegger (1999a: 25) took us further into the question of talk as a statement of "publicness" and the need for us to be "wide-awake" for and in "today", as he draws attention to the attempts "to get a grasp of the today hermeneutically through wide-ranging and longwinded discussions which provide entertaining portraits of the so-called most interesting tendencies of the present", which he identifies as "hermeneutical explication", but one that "must constantly struggle against the possibility of getting sidetracked ... " (25). The "ontology of Dasein must be hermeneutical, that is, aware of its own historical formation and indefatigably attentive to the problem of interpretation" (Krell, 1999: 21).

The early Heidegger, while largely influenced by Husserl's phenomenology and Dilthey's hermeneutical investigations, questions the limits of transcendental phenomenology as a way of understanding being-in-the-world. He questions philosophy's reliance upon "traditional epistemologies and metaphysical systems that appeared to have forgotten the salient features of human being as being-in-the-world" (Urmson and Rée, 1995: 129); and has forgotten the question of being in the being who questions. His approach towards hermeneutics, which is engaged in a deeper sense in Being and Time (1996) is demanding a reappraisal of hermeneuein 'to interpret', and hermeneutike (techne) 'the art of interpretation', by interpreting the being who interprets texts in the world, including, and by example (in his later writings), works of art as the work of art.

If art as work has the potential to reveal a strife of being-in-the-world, then there must be a calling up, an unfolding or revealing of the world beyond what might simply be the interpretive public talk about the work as object/event. However, in the institutionalisation of the art as aesthetic
object, "hermeneutical explication" has become a dominating facet of 'art world' representations with their dependence on interpretation of aesthetic and cultural values.

This is a fundamental characteristic of disciplinary and public talk that underlies the interpretive disciplines, institutionalised and publicly normalised, in which the work of art is positioned and from which institutional and public practices feed. Art History, Media Studies, Discourse Analysis, Cultural Studies and even the Creative Arts (visual, dance, music etc) have largely depended upon such interpretive qualities of discourse for their legitimating technologies of method, manner and meaning in the making, positioning and evaluating of the work of art as a representational practice or product. This is not to say that 'representation' per se has not been thoroughly deconstructed and reconsidered through post-Heideggerian, poststructuralist engagements on the dominance of 'what is seen'. Yet it is fair to say that there appears to be, in education as in the art world, a continuing re-inscription of interpretive frameworks by which self-validating scaffolds are built, and by which the work of education, and the work of art, might be positioned in a metaphysically inscribed world of categories. In this sense, in our institutional practices with their pragmatism and accountabilities, we are conditioned to respond, no doubt neutrally, to a productionist demand. The command is determined by, and determines, the need to labour towards order, to 'sort out' the world technologically and work (within) it as a rationally ordered 'self' coursing teleologically through history towards a 'better' future. Are we, in fact, Enframed by our well-intentioned and self-perpetuating typologies and truths around which institutional discourses construct (manufacture) a series of propositions that are accountable to logic? Is this Heidegger's identifiable "danger" in the technologised constructions of thought, knowledge and truth?

Rather than assuming correspondence with a series of logical propositions, Heidegger works through questions concerning technē and Poësis as a way of revealing the "danger" and a possible "saving-power". Heidegger's concern for technology as an Enframing and ordering forth of causality, as discussed in "The Question Concerning Technology" (1977a: 12), proposes a way of thinking through the essence of technology, which Heidegger says is "by no means anything technological" (1977a: 4). "So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology" (Heidegger, 1977a: 32). In seeking its essence, Heidegger turns to the German poet Hölderlin: "But where danger is, grows / the saving power also" (28 & 34). And from Hölderlin he shows that "the essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving Power": then almost immediately asks, "in what respect does the saving power grow there also where the danger is?"; and then, we have said that in technology's essence roots and thrives the saving power" (28-29). Heidegger's way of working through these questions on the essence of technology is a way of movement, a way of disclosure through the temporality of process; and in that process there lies his work of revealing. "Technology is a way of revealing, he writes; and, "It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne is a bringing-forth" (13).

Accepting the task at hand is to recognise the "bringing forth" in the work of art and education, we might then ask of Heidegger, how might such "bringing forth" be brought forth? And Heidegger might reply, "Technology comes to presence ... m the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens" (1977a: 13), and "the revealing that brings forth (poiesis) is also a way that has the character of destinining" (29). We might then ask, what of truth? Of truth, explains Heidegger (1977a: 11-12), "[t]he Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing", which was translated by the Romans to veritas, and in modern language, truth, usually understood as "the correctness of an idea". And then we will see that throughout his writings Heidegger seeks to move "truth" further towards the ancient Greek conception of "revealing".

**Dasein and interpretation**

"Letting beings be, which is an attuning, a bringing into accord, prevails throughout and anticipates all the open comportment that flourishes in it" (Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth", 19996: 129).
Munch was walking across a bridge and at that moment in time “the sky turned blood-red”; he stood there ‘Trembling with anxiety’. In his diaries of the 1890s Munch writes of this moment, and these words are ultimately thrown out to the world to be interpreted and represented into ‘meaning’ as a metaphor of the fin de siècle of the nineteenth century. How might Dasein be at work in the work of art (in the painting as in the words) as a way of opening or dismantling re-presentation and opening the space of disclosure to something other? In his lectures on the work of art (at Freiburg, Zurich and Frankfurt, 1935-36), later published (1950) as the full and richly written essay The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger argues, as explained by David Krell in his introduction to the English translation (1999c: 141), that “revelation belongs to every work of art: the work erects a world which in turn opens a space for man and things”. How might such a space be opened to work as a “clearing of being”, in the work itself, we might ask? Krell then notes that perhaps the greatest challenge of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is “how through the work of art we are to envisage the creative strife of world and earth” (1999c: 141). Heidegger is thus moving us beyond the work of art as a “standing-reserve” (1977a: 15), as an object of aesthetic judgement, or of mere making as a technologised event of techne. He is moving us beyond representation in the subject-object relations of knowing and being in the world. He is moving us elsewhere, other than the mode of concealing the very poïësis that may be entailed in the work of art, and turning us towards a “revealing which in the sense of poïësis, lets what presences come forth into appearance” (Heidegger, 1977a: 27). Thus Heidegger is moving us towards ergon that characterizes the manner of presencing ... to presence-as-work (presence understood verbally) in the work of work-ness” (Heidegger, 1973: 5).

The Scream may compel us by its “creative strife”, as the moment of recognition of terror (that which presences) comes forth into appearance”. Munch’s moment of terror comes forth during a walk at sunset on a trip to Ekebergsasen. Is that the sort of presencing Heidegger speaks of, where the mask-like face of one solitary figure, with open mouth, hands clutched to side of head, opens “what presences” in and to the world? But through art historical discourses, in the way this work of art has been understood, terms like ‘presencing’ are not liberally scattered. Revealed are lineages and links back to the past or forward to the future - a schema of progressive thought in the relations of Idea and Energeia, Whatness and Thatness (Heidegger, 1973). For example, this death-mask of Munch’s may be traced epistemologically through textual inter-connections, such as those suggested by art historian Robert Rosenblum, in the influences of a Peruvian mummy at the Musée de l’Homme in Paris (see Bischoff, 1990: 53-55); and also to literary sources such as Dostoyevsky and philosophies of Kierkegaard, whose outlook brings impending natural disaster into a soul “so heavy that no thought can uplift it any more. Oppressiveness and anxiety are brooding over my inner being, sensing an earthquake to come” (cited in Bischoff, 1990: 54). And there is the possible forward link to Rainer Maria Rilke who, in 1920, refused to write on Oskar Kokoschka on the basis that “Munch’s lines already included this constructive power of terror- but there was infinitely more of Nature in him than in Kokoschka, and so he was always able to reconcile the opposites of preservation and destruction in purely spatial terms, to blunt their edge in an image or picture ... ” (cited in Bischoff, 1990: 54-55). However, from whence springs this language, by which Munch’s work is represented? Could it be the framing echoes of the Humanist art historian tracing the referential content of the work, and seeking to locate its place and position in linear time? What else, or other, might be at work in the ‘work-ness’ of the present undertaking, and what else might be spoken by the other who speaks?

In the essay “The Origin of the Work of Art”, Heidegger speaks of Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of old, well-worn peasant shoes. “But what is there to see here?” he asks. “Everyone knows what shoes consist of” (1999c: 158). Thus in emphasising what is commonly known he is effectively problematising the given-ness of art as a visual field of representation that corresponds to some object or other ‘out-there’ in the world, and the endless interpretations of content and form that art commentators are given to, that come under the umbrella of ‘representation’ - locating through image and language the ‘known’ objects or entities in the world of appearances. “Form and content are the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed”, iterates
Heidegger (1999c: 153); and then takes us further in our considerations by stating, "The work makes public something other than itself" (145). So, it is the 'other' in the work, or elsewhere, that we must be open to when confronted with art.

**Midnight is never far away**

Heidegger seeks to "discover the essence of the art that actually prevails in the work" (1999c: 144) when he asks: "What happens here? What is at work?" This is a fundamental question for consideration by the educator in the field of the 'art' disciplines, be they visual or fine arts, media arts or music, dance or drama, written or oral, poetry or novel, design or new-media technologies. When 'the arts' per se are encountered (made/considered/disseminated/engaged/ performed/revealed) in spaces of pedagogy, what happens; what prevails? Skills and technologies? Manipulation of methods and media? Aesthetics and appreciation? Marketing and management? Exhibition and events? Techniques and technologies? Idea and Energeia? What is being brought into proximity with what? What distanced? What processes or assumptions are at work here? Heidegger confronts the "pair of concepts, matter-form" (hyle, matter; morphe, form), when he says, "the distinction of matter and form is the conceptual schema which is used, in the greatest variety of ways, quite generally for all art theory and aesthetics" (1999c: 153). Questioning the schema is crucial to Heidegger's project. Where lie the historical separations, we ask; and Heidegger answers, "The metaphysics of the modern period rests on the form-matter structure" (1999c: 156); and we see we are working through a dismantling of historically embedded prescriptions of thought-systems and ways of 'knowing/being' in the world, as we work towards an opening space of ergon.

In "Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics" we read: "Every sort of thought ... is always only the execution and consequence of a mode of historical Dasein, of the fundamental position taken toward Being and toward the way in which beings are manifest as such, i.e., toward truth .... " (Heidegger, 1999d: 295-296). The historical modes whereby formal categories are constructed are so patently functional in the production and interpretation of art, as in the production of knowledge, and the production of corresponding 'understanding' in education, work, and in the world at large. Reading through Heidegger, it soon becomes apparent that his project is re-thinking the division of matter and form in the dismantling of Western metaphysics, re-thinking the question of being and time, to overcome aesthetics and appreciation with their objectifying of the work of art, (for an analytical approach to aesthetics, see Dickie, 1997), to overturn the limiting of techne to technocratic, technological means-end thinking, and to question instrumentalist technology by re-thinking it in more 'human' terms. Yet our dominant world-models of technology, institutional, public and educational practices, including in the arts and education, have been founded and formed on such causal demands of work as labour, a progressive means-end relationship. The formulation of our 'selves' as 'subjects' within these demands and their demanding ends is now exacerbated via the new formulations of 'knowledge economy' and 'knowledge society', heavy with the politics of accountability in production and management - be it teaching or research, business or marketing, arts or engineering, science or health, or the fundamentally social acts of working and living 'in neighbourhoods' (societal groupings). Even the industries of 'care' and 'hospitality', entertainment and media, sport and religion have been folded into this means-end instrumentalism in a highly pragmatised worldview in which no one/thing/ event/work is outside the defining métier. By these means we are enframed. What is this 'work' of living, of technology, of education, of public discourse, that we perform and by which we are shaped? How might we, and the 'work', come into some other relational mode of being in the temporality of our meeting?

If the work 'as a world' opens a space to something other than itself as an 'object-being' to be represented, and according to Heidegger it does, then working towards an understanding of this process might be liberating in some way. As we walk in the shadow of technologised demands, we are disciplined by institutional governance, frameworks events, newly devised (always newly, for the future). 'Creative Industries', for example, now walks the horizon of the Enframed present, inscribing
new modes of 'being creative'. Art aligned with 'creative'? (Wasn't it always of poiësis: create?); with 'industry' (Wasn't it always industrious?); and 'technology' (techne: make; didn't it always involve making?). Ah, but these alignments correspond with new political 'truths' by which the world will now be known in the knowledge economy's means-end worldview. Framing the future, even time is brought sharply into technological focus when the 'arts' are 'industries' - a perfect correspondence of art with labour. They come to us with purpose m mmd; technologised in their purposeful-ness; industrious in their determinations- Kantian in their pre-suppositions, with their purposiveness constructed as a category equating with 'objectivity'. New identities coagulate to mirror the language of government policy: today the Faculty of Arts is subdivided as The Faculty of Design and Creative Technologies is born into a technologised world of values where 'culture' is subsumed by the definitions of 'industry', and where 'creative' is technologised as "standing-reserve" for ...we know not what. Elsewhere the School of Fine Arts transmogrifies into the National Institute of Creative Arts and Industries; and so on and on. Enframed in technologised correspondences, practice must follow policy if funding is to be secured; and the way of art simply must change its attitudes to work, its parameters, its boundaries, its language, itself-ness, to meet technology's productionist demands.

With slips of language tensions appear. Does the foot fit the slipper; and how long will the fit last? Is time the "danger" or "saving power"? Is the educator, in the words of Nietzsche (1874), "ringed around with frightful abysses, and every step he takes ought to make him ask: Wither? Whence? To what end?" (Breazeale 1997: 35, cited in Grierson, 2000: 109). Midnight is never far away.

The work of art and unconcealment

What else might be at work in "the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens" (Heidegger, 1977a: 13) if "the revealing that brings forth (poiësis)is also a way that has the character of destining" (29)? It seems that we have now come beyond art as a 'thing' to be represented, as we move towards the question of revealing as truth in the work; and with that we have emerged from the reliance on the correspondence theory of truth into another process of truth happening in the work of art. All these questions, and more, are worked-through by Heidegger in "The Origin of the Work of Art" where, in his customary style of circularity, he started with the nub of the problem concerning the origin of the work of art - "The artist is the origin of the work. The work is the origin of the artist. Neither is without the other" (1999c: 143), and circled through questions of Thing and Work" (146-165), "Work and Truth" (165-182), "Truth and Art" (182-203) (following his three lectures), ending with an Epilogue referring to "the riddle of art" and noting that his foregoing reflections "are far from claiming to solve the riddle. The task is to see the riddle" (204). So what sort of riddle what sort of "disclosure" is taking place here? For the reader there has been no easy solution, no correspondence in questioning the question of truth. The reader has been set to work as the truth is set to work in the work of language.

What happens, in Heideggerian terms, through the work of art, as in the reading of the text, is an unconcealment of questions of concealment, "where aletheia, truth, happens". The relations of reader/viewer, writer/artist, text/ image, are inflecting each other when brought into relations through language. For Heidegger the work of art is neither "present-at-hand" nor "ready-to-hand" as the entities in Being and Time. As Smeyers explains (2002: 82), "The work of art is neither of these but rather an entity through which the truth of beings is disclosed -it has a privileged relation to Being, similar only to that accorded to Dasein". Krell writes of Heidegger's later thoughts on this relation in "Building Dwelling Thinking" (1951):

To the thing as technological component and as scientific object Heidegger opposes the thing as the place where the truth of Being, disclosedness, happens. In the work of art such disclosedness is compellingly experienced - perhaps most of all in the work of poetry (Krell, 1999: 344).
So in Munch's work of art something more than experiencing art as categorised thing or entity, aesthetic or cultural document is to be considered possible. The work opens a space where the world might be 'pictured' in different ways. Firstly, the art work has been represented in its referential object-being, via the image content of a man by a fjord, overwrought with anxiety, metaphorised in terms of 'Man' in a contemporary: state of being in a modern and 'destitute' Western world at the end of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the picture of a man overcome with anxiety is brought, in its 'workly character', into relation with the world in a way that presences, that "gather[s] towards presencing, by that which opens itself" (19776: 131) to the world of strife. In the first, via epistemological processes of representation, Munch was in correspondence with the clutter, confusion, and over-occupation of social and personal spaces of anxiety. He was surrounded by mortality and angst; the evidence records it; and he thereby expressed it in a painting whose iconography was later interpreted in the language of grand universalism as the sublime moment of terror before Nature. As Bischoff (1990: 53) put it, "the fear and loneliness of Man in a natural setting which - far from offering any kind of consolation - picks up the scream and echoes it beyond the bay unto the bloody vaults of heaven". Then there is the media interpretation of The Scream as an object of correspondence in the contemporary event of an art heist.

However, Heidegger's way of thinking about the work of art and its relation to Dasein involves something more, in the work, that perhaps we have not yet located. If his way of thinking raises the question of Dasein, as an essential relation to questions about the work of art, it follows that Dasein is well-embedded in these historically inflected discussions where lies "the constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass" (Heidegger, 1977a: 33).

The 'destitution' of modernity

The Scream stands historically as an iconic work of the modern world's sense of anxiety, but what of its presencing? Heidegger was not alone in his diagnosis of modernity and its 'sickness'. Commentators place him alongside Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard (see, for example, David Roberts on Heidegger and Existentialism, 1966; although Lovitt (1977: xiii) writes, "Heidegger is not an 'existentialist'. He is not concerned centrally or exclusively with man").

Heidegger's concern was deeper than an epistemological arena of enquiry. His concern was with "the relations between man and Being, with man as the openness to which and in which being presents and is known (Lovitt, 1977: xiii). His project was deeply historical as it sought to deconstruct the determinations of historical Being in its a priori conceptions, from the metaphysical lineage and sovereignty of Aristotle and Kant in Western thinking. Working through this project, Heidegger located the question of truth through three junctures of history: "in the human or divine intellect" (Thomas Aquinas); "nowhere but in the mind" (Descartes); and in the epoch of the incipient consummation of the modern age" (Nietzsche) (Krell in Heidegger, 1991: 252).

Where, then, lies the potential for "the incipient consummation" as the working through of 'truth' in the 'presencing' of the work of art; and how could such 'presencing' be a process of revealing of what and how 'truth' presences? In Heidegger's work there is deep underlying concern with a "sickness" of the modern world with its calculative thinking and "extinction of 'the divine radiance'" (Young, 2002: 35). What is at stake here? Heidegger (1977a: 33) puts it this way:

The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the un Concealedness of standing-reserve. Human activity can never directly counter this danger. Human achievement alone can never banish it.

A grave danger is identified, that of the extinguishing of revealing through the consuming ordering of technology as "standing-reserve", and Heidegger sees this as a 'destitution'. Heidegger "identifies three leading symptoms of modernity's spiritual 'sickness': loss of the gods, the 'violence' of
technology, and loss of 'dwelling' or 'homelessness'' (Young, 2002: 3). These fundamental concerns for the modern world - the Western world of productionist metaphysics - underlie Heidegger's project with its acute awareness of Dasein's "own interpretive origins [as] a 'destructuring' or dismantling of the transmitted conceptual apparatus, a clearing of the congested arteries of a philosophical tradition that has all the answers but no longer experiences the questions - especially the question of its own provenance and purpose" (Krell, 1999: 21) - hence, the 'diagnosis'.

Firstly, there is "loss of the gods" (Young, 2002: 32), which entails "loss of community" (32-33). Then the inability of man to "dwell", that is "loss of being at home in the world, loss of 'homeliness' in the sense of the German heimisch - which Heidegger takes to constitute the 'plight' of modern humanity (BDT, p. 161)" (Young, 2002: 33). In this loss there is "modern man's inability to 'own' death (WPF, p. 96). This is significantly the source of our anxiety as a "fundamental way of being-in-the-world" as we are fundamentally "insecure" and "homeless", and as "we cannot own death, and since pain is an intimation of death, we cannot own pain either" (Young, 2002: 33). The third major symptom, "the violence' of modern technology - its violation of both non-human and human nature", reduces all to "'raw material' for the process of production and consumption, a process which has no purpose other than its own self-perpetuation ... and to fill up the emptiness left by the meaninglessness of modern life", noting that this is particular to Western modernity (33). Heidegger (1977a: 17): "Everywhere, everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering ... We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]."

So by these diagnoses 'man' is a sorry state in a world of over-technologised "standing-reserve" which is the danger and the destitution; and from there Heidegger proposes a "saving power" that could be accessed through the work of art in its revealing of spatial/temporal "relations" beyond its mere "object-being". "The whole art industry, even if carried to the extreme and exercised in every way for the sake of works themselves, extends only to the object-being of the works. But this does not constitute their work-being", says Heidegger (1999c: 166) as he turns to a particular work of art to show more clearly the 'work' of 'disclosure': Van Gogh's painting of peasant shoes, which are "a pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet" (1999c: 159). He then shows, by his way of working through his text, that the painting "is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes is in truth. This work-being emerges into the unconcealment of beings, aletheia" (Heidegger, 1999c: 161). In this section of his essay he makes clear that we must not just settle for seeing or imagining "a pair of shoes in general, or simply look at the empty, unused shoes as they merely stand there in the picture" (1999c: 159). What we are seeking to discover is "what the equipmental being of the equipment in truth is" (159). So the being, Dasein must be interpreted in its moment of time and being as it brings the relations of time and being into proximity as a mode of "belonging". "From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself" (160).

He presents the exemplar of "the old wooden bridge" (in QCT, 1977a: 16; and BDT, 1999e: 354) spanning the river from bank to bank, which "brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighbourhood" (354), as belonging in and with itself and gathering all into earth. The bridge "dwell" thereby in the relations of its being rather than dominating technologically as object in the landscape. Heidegger speaks also of the relational quality of the Greek temple that "makes visible the invisible space of air" as it "illumines also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling" - that is earth, "the sheltering agent" (1999c: 168). The Temple reveals a relational space of being: "The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth" (168); and he takes this to the work of art and asks, "what, then, does the work-being of the work consist?" (169); and brings us to 'see' a work of art that is "set up" in a collection or exhibition in terms of its work-being relations rather than its object-being, and he asks, "What does the work, as work, set up?" And he answers this way: "Towering up within itself, the work opens up a world and keeps it abidingly in force" (169).
The work follows the movement of showing as a way of concluding

Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it.

Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part, does not shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are questioning (Heidegger, 1977a: 35).

This paper has been questioning as it seeks to disclose something about the work of art and education, something about presencing in the work-being of work, something about being in time, in and with the world. There is something very temporal about this paper in the process of its writing/reading. It appeals to no sense of transcendental hope that it will be grabbed and disseminated as the ultimate answer for a new pedagogical approach to art and/or education. If there is a 'heeding [of] Heidegger's way' in the process of its writing/reading, then a process of "revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence of truth, comes to pass" (1977a: 33) may be at work.

Heidegger said, "the work erects a world which in turn opens a space for man and things" (1999c: 141). If there is a clearing, an opening, through which "the truth of beings has set itself to work" (Heidegger, 1999c: 162) in the 'workly' character of work, then technology might be at work here as "no mere means" ... as "a way of revealing". "If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth" (Heidegger, 1977a: 12).

If the work-being of the work of art can open up spaces for unconcealment relations in the world, as a horizon of disclosure of both the "danger" and "saving power", then as educators we may seek a similar mode of unconcealment in our work. We may set ourselves to work as the "setting forth" of being and disclosure in the horizon of our disciplines. We may thus set ourselves to work as a work of art in Heidegger's sense. In art, as in education, we may then open spaces "not to listen to a series of propositions but rather to follow the movement of showing" (Heidegger, On Time and Being, 1972) as we dismantle the pre-suppositions embedded in our metaphysically of thinking, being and doing in Western frames of 'knowing' the world. Rather than the Enframing of such correspondences in the world of work and living, we might heed Heidegger's way of throwing light upon the fundamental limitations of subject-object separations as a way of being in and with the world. Then, hearing Heidegger, we might set ourselves to work in such a way that exposes those limits and "in the sense of poiësis, lets what presences come forth into appearance" (1977a: 27). And here lies the project of this essay, to "pay heed to the way" as a "way of thinking" (3), and to reveal something of "the constellation of truth after which we are questioning" (3 5) in the time of poiësis in our "work-being".

References


