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Fault-erring; On the Styles of Margins (Blanchot/Heidegger)

Maria O'Connor

Auckland University of Technology

ABSTRACT

Performativity-the aporias of writing; a pathway to remembering Being. In this paper the writer poses a (Derridian/deconstructive) question concerning the paradoxical nature of thinking identity in the singular, i.e., it is always in operation on the level of the multiple. Perhaps for many it is an obvious statement to make about identity and yet the writer seeks to probe the increasing dynamics of this question from the position of thinking identity transmitted via language; a process that involves both writing and reading (technological pursuits via their proximity to systems and structures of knowledge/disciplines; laws of genres). The key register and method here is textual play (or performative writing) that seeks to reflexively engage us in this question of identity via attention given to the existence of plural styles within a writer's (and reader's) activity. Here we conflate the styles (laws and motifs) of the literary-philosophical writer, Maurice Blanchot, to the philosopher Martin Heidegger with a central concern to reveal something about Heidegger's thinking lodged in his writing style(s) in his seminal essay "The Question Concerning Technology" (1977). This is an essay that is concerned centrally with our technological epoch and Heidegger's call to the remembrance of Being (the essence of humankind), through a precarious recognition of "the essence of technology [which] is by no means anything technological" (1977: 4) (one immediately gets a sense here of the paradoxical nature of Heidegger's thinking, with respect to identity per se, in his thought contained within this isolated and well-coined stylistic phrase). The allegiance (Blanchot/Heidegger and their proximal motifs of thought) also serves to bring emphasis to the distance between an ontological and ontic engagement (terms that are fully explored in the paper) in the act of reading any writer who celebrates thinking on the borderlines to reveal "new" questions chat lie within the fragments of unthought thought (throughout the inscribed history of humankind). Such proximity of thinking places further emphasis on how each writer refuses closure of any one style, or char writing, as its conditions of possibility, is the borderline crossings of styles (of identity).

Pure Passivity: no *one* speaks

The writer belongs to a language *no one speaks,* a language that is not addressed to anyone, that has no center, that reveals nothing. He can believe he is asserting himself in this language, but what he is asserting is completely without a self. ... Where he is, only being speaks, which means that speech no longer speaks, but simply is-dedicates itself to the pure passivity of being (Blanchot, 1999a: 407, my emphasis).

We might wish for something to be enunciated in this language that no one speaks, a language that is not addressed to anyone and "I" am *speaking* (but think here of an impossible separation of phonocentricism - a privilege of hearing our voice even as we read - and graphism) here and now to an audience that is yet to be addressed, even as you are reading here, and now is addressed to no one. This is not only a spatial and temporal concern, it also bears relations to the relations of language and speech in terms of representations or images of identity. A speech that finds itself silent, an inner ear or inner voice that transforms into nothing that is, speech no longer speaks as if it had never spoken at all.[1] We might also wish for, even within the realms of Blanchot's "unavowable community" where the pure passivity of being dwells, a technology of thought to be applied in writing, a thought of technology that reveals in essence something of Heidegger and his concerns concerning technology.

This type of production of thought comes before us (as in the temporal-spatio register of propositional correctness). It is after all the law "speaking," a law according to presentation, re-presentation in and of a genre of writing. We may wish for writing to reveal something more than Blanchot's concerns with the loss of self afforded to the writer. And what writer? What species of writing is being referred to here? Perhaps we can reveal something of a type (a font, fount, origin, typographism, typology, typical) that perhaps belongs to Blanchot's "unavowable corn-: munity" where being is revealed through the inaudible and the inauguration of passivity. Firstly, we must acknowledge the type of writer Blanchot is, and to say *yes(/yes),*[2] the writer of literature may indeed be the writer he is privileging in this self-abandoned region. The writer that affords more positions or moves that mark a course of polysemic augmentation. The space of literature is indeed a site, which holds a privileged position according to the law of (its) genres, generics, generals, genealogy (forms, modes, modals, contents, classifications, affirmations, order's principle: resemblance, analogy, identity, and difference, taxonomic classification, organisation and genealogical tree, order of reason, orders of reasons, sense of sense, truth of truth, natural light and sense of history). Thus a space of literature might prescribe to, and inscribe an, expected free-play inexhaustable in the myriad rearrangement of structural representations, and yet we must not forget this word *law. As* Derrida reminds us, within the freeplay of literature's language(s), its genres, a generic agreement is held, that is a loyalty to the laws of its origin, an origin that has its origin in many other laws of writing (philosophy, psychoanalysis, theology etc) and, in this respect, the borderlines of literature's genre become both extended and blurred. But we must not hold up (arrest/ sentence) Blanchot as the typical prototype of such laws as his writing is one that places itself more firmly than most on the margins of the (literary) law. As Derrida notes in his commentary on Blanchot's "story" *(récit)* "The Madness of the Day":

> This is not an example of a general or generic whole. Not of the whole, not at all. Of the whole, which begins by finishing and never finishes beginning apart from itself, o the whole that stays at the edgeless boundary of itself, of the whole greater and less than a whole and nothing. "A *recit?"* will not have been exemplary. Rather, with regard to the whole, it will have been wholly counter-exemplary (1992: 251- 252).[3]

Writing on the law

To write in or of any writer's language is to hover between the law of commentary (the impossible Blanchotian *'récit)* and the fictive nature of (the) law itself. To write of a writer's language one must also encompass, through encounter, the laws of other genres that hover on the margins of literature's own genealogical borderlines. These borderlines welcome the genres of, as mentioned earlier, for example, religion, the juridical, philosophy and psychoanalysis. They are included without being explicit and, indeed, their presence may be recognisable only in the openness of the borders we now experience in some writings that present the unrecognisable self. These *some writings* respond to the point of view that abandons itself to a "we" where being, simply put, *is.* And it is these *some* "type" of *writings* that we should now be getting a sense of here that is a central concern for

this paper. A concern for a sum, the addition of two writers who write together insofar as they weave their thinking into texts that hover on the margins more than most. Texts that hover in the *margins of philosophy* (a genre that has been described as a non-philosophy through its break from the tradition of Western metaphysics), and the margins of literature, or at least the presentation of literary figures that exist within lines of these writers' unthought-thought.

We have mentioned so far the two names of Blanchot and Derrida. And so, what if Heidegger in his questioning of the essence of technology revealed nothing technological? That is, what if his writing was the essence of a writing that revealed this loss-of-'T' location where the instrumentation of the progressional "I" had no place? That is, an instrumental "I" that affirmed a law by facing it when in actuality the law is not faceable.[4] (And we will return again to the Heideggerian notion of essence and relations of proximity). What are we facing here but a face effaced by the presentation of a technologised present. That is, to see his writing as an instrument of effacement of the self in order that we might see 'ourselves' more clearly on the terms of a forgetting of ego to reveal the remembrance of Being. So, perhaps this writing (but whose? 'This' in its here and now has become a referential field a little undecidable) is an act of revealing something about the ways in which the present defaults via the *impossible* stare into the face of the present. This *impossible* face is only seen in this light of day as the absolute empirical gaze with light so blinding that darkness pervades in all its recessional figures. It is of course the edges, recesses filled with darkness that contain the power of this gaze. We are seduced here by these dark figures if only to realise that the presence of its light is a trick (glance/blink) of the eye (I). These recesses therefore are only visible in a light that reflects itself through an event of not-seeing, where the self abandons itself and the trait of being's essence is allowed its course.[5]

If in Heidegger's writing we witness a Blanchotian loss of the self in the act of writing, it can perhaps be spoken of here from a cited line. One line, and yet, there are many to choose from. And, it is a line that takes its passage from the literary origins of poetry. He writes "we" in the appropriation of Hölderlin's voice: "But where danger is, grows/ The saving power also" (Heidegger, 1977: 28 & 34). We know here that he is making reference to the act of enframing, or the technological essence of Enframing, where *storing* is paradoxically a resource *and* a measure of loss of way. Hölderlin's appropriated voice is, one could say, an act of Enframing; a resource ready to Heidegger's hand. A re-making and re-marking on the lines of storage. What is stored is danger, a danger of forgetting, a type or genre of forgetting based on the seduction of saving power. Power which saves what has already been stored, and yet we are to believe it is not in the *what* has been stored that reveals being, but rather in the *how,* an excessiveness or abundance, that reveals a progressional dream. But this might seem too reductive a reading here of these appropriated lines. A simplicity of reading put simply that paradoxically reveals the nothing, but simply put, reveals the affirmation of a remembrance of essence, rather than some face-to-face account of technology.[6]

We may even wish to suggest that Heidegger is revealing the very essence of technology, or essence of essence, through a revealing of the genre of technocracy, a genre of thinking of the self, governed by the very law of progression. One could refer here to concepts of linearity, unification, and so on and on. Let us suggest affirmation for this paradox of essence revealed in the aforementioned borrowed words and reach now for another line that points further to the circularity of Heidegger's thought. "The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth" (Heidegger, 1977: 33). A lofty sense, a sense above, as in the *in-situ* of the loft. 'Above' implicating the spatial-temporal re-assessment of progressional thought. Sited in a place that cannot be mapped through the instruments of technology, but evented and evidenced in a coming to presence of technology. These last words "in a coming to presence" is the ambiguity that reveals essence. The language used here is premised by a warning of the danger of Enframing, which threatens man's free essence. A sign of warning premised in turn by the relief in acts of vigilance. To quote "the dignity lies in keeping watch over the unconcealment" (Heidegger, 1977: 32). Like this sentient pre-cursor Heidegger's writing reveals, in circulatory motion,

acts of unconcealment for this moment to come. And we in our own lost way are referring not only to the necessity of paying heed to the coming to presence of technology but also of writing.

Acts of Vigilance: the proximity of Blanchot to Heidegger

Let us return to relations of proximity with respect to unconcealment, that is, a spatial-temporal eventing of unconcealment coterminous with Heidegger's acts of vigilance. In our attempt to tie *these writers of some texts,* we return to Blanchot, for his text's emphasis on acts of sentience that reveal the selfless region of Being's essence (the essence of essence). "The Essential Solitude" (1999a) holds another kind of sensibility to Blanchot's previously cited text "The Madness of the Day" (19996). Where the latter could be categorised as a literary work of fiction, "The Essential Solitude" leans more convincingly toward a philosophy of literature (or a literature of philosophy whereby rather than Blanchot seeing literature as a question *of* philosophy, he understands it as a question posed *to* philosophy). "The Essential Solitude" is a philosophical account of a literary writer's experiential encounter with the act of writing.

We get a sense, from this paper's opening quote, and through reading Blanchotian texts, which play implicitly with the law of genres, that, in both of these *stories,* law in all *her* figures demarcates the boundaries of Being in both Being's forgotten-ness and revelation. We encounter sentient characters or motifs of sentience within "The Essential Solitude" that coincide with reading the essence of "man" in terms of a proximal spacing of its factual existence and the being of its existence. In "The Essential Solitude," Blanchot gives us an analogy of the hand that *doesn't* write as belonging to a world of Mastery, the hand that can intervene just when it has to. The hand that writes is a "sick" hand oblivious to a self-mastery. Mastery, then, consists of the power to stop writing, to interrupt what is being written. Being written or writing that reveals being is an act of constancy, where the hand that writes pervades into the depths of passivity, a site where self-consciousness cannot exist through the act of self-effacement. This hand that writes is oblivious to the hand that watches, ready to intervene, interrupt, pounce upon the "sick" hand so that property of the self is regained.

In Blanchot's emphasis on the hands, we could draw on the spacing or separation, which is to say, the dexterity of an implied manual 'art' or fabrication, the hand span or spanning of the hands in their difference that within this text metaphorically causes a splitting of the (writing) subject. A subject who writes (what Blanchot names the 'sick' hand) enters the realms of a remembrance of being in the forgetting of the Self that constitutes the "I" or ego Self, equipped with a knowledge of the world of things in all their light. And on the other hand, is the Master hand, where a struggle is encountered via the interpretation and invasion of a determinable world, that keeps a close eye on time and itself, where up-closeness is valued in order to interrupt for a questioning concerning *what is* (the essence of *isness)* so that production of man's ends is always kept in check.

This nearness is the proximal account of the law that we alluded to earlier in Blanchot's notion of the *récit*: a recourse required by law(s) that verify who or what is according to testimony, a discourse of the law that denies its fictive hand-writing. A sacrifice that is legitimately made so that in the light of day we see all the more clearly so that a kind of blindness to the possibility of plurality and dissemination, that is, so leakages of a questioning concerning what it is to be in the multiple margins of fiction and fact are in fact rapidly forgotten. This is Blanchot's scene of the Master hand. And so, "The Essential Solitude" and "The Madness of the Day" both pay heed to the questioning concerning the essence of being of being's way through a kind of forgetting in the margins of genres' laws that open up a space for remembering an essence of being. A remembrance in the reminder that forgetting is a crucial component of the law, because in order to give testimony to who and what we are, the law prescribes that in some way we need to have lost *our* way according to *its* way. And it is in this self-judgement and judgement of the self via the Other (of the Law) that Blanchot is twice seduced, by and in the name of the law. It is a self-judgement and judgement-of-self that paradoxically reinforces both the law and the forgetting of ourselves in the "I" (eye) of the

law - that is, insofar as we forget how to judge who we are according to determinant prescriptions of validation, mentioned earlier. A validation based on the up-close, the proximal that engages with a linear movement of time and being. And it is this kind of double forgetting that locates the loss-of-Self in the indwelling of language, another kind of being (human) that Blanchot names as the pure passivity of being.

This convergence, this demarcation, this attendance to figures of the law in Blanchotian terms, we would like to suggest here, is perhaps close to the Heideggerian motif of proximity. We can recognise the importance of the thinking of proximity with respect to Heideggerian Being as presence in the question of distance and distantiation of distance, so pivotal for his thinking of Being's essence and the thinking of *Dasein*, well-coined in "The Question Concerning Technology": "the essence of technology is by no means anything technological" (Heidegger, 1977: 4).

Acts of Presencing: pure passivity (Blanchot) in Heideggerian *Dasein*

The radicality of Heidegger's thinking lies in the emphasis he gives to antic/ontological difference. He suggests that the history of metaphysics has developed such that the question in general of "what is" - that is the question of being - has been approached fundamentally ontically. We search for the being of things by looking at those things and determining their essential properties. The question of being is answered by approaching the beings in the world that are. Hence metaphysics is dominated by a notion of time as a sequence of "nows" constitutive of a continuum of past, present and future, with the present constitutive of the horizon of questioning the beings that are, the beings chat are no longer and the beings that are yet to be. This is a metaphysics of presence, dominated by an antic engagement with the presence of entities encountered in the world. If we suggested the discourses of genres (the law of their laws) are of a "classical" metaphysics, it is precisely this metaphysics of presence to which we were alluding. Two major implications of a metaphysics of presence are firstly, metaphysics is fundamentally anthropocentric and anthropomorphic in as much as the question "what is" is posed by human being concerning entities in the world including the being human of human being. The second implication is that metaphysics is productionist in that any question "what is" is for human ends.

Heidegger's break is that he suggests the question "what is" is not derived ontically but ontologically. Productionist metaphysics, inaugurated with Platonism is coincident with the forgetting of Being, or the is-ness of what is. Hence, ontological determinations of Being cannot be founded or based on the being of beings, or what is, but rather on that which construes the revealing of beings. This has radical implications for the determination of the human, whose orthodox formation is one or other variations on an empirico-rationalist subject in a world of objects. Heideggerian *Dasein* is constitutive of a radical break from empirico-rationalism, and the humanism at its core, both as subject/object divide and as anthropocentric psychological entity. *Dasein* is that being whose temporality is the collision of pastness and futurity in its project of thrown-ness into a world of ready-to-hand things. Hence, Heideggerian metaphysics radicalises "presence" of being into a "presencing" of Being-becoming. Heidegger will make a fundamental distinction on questioning the essence of truth. With productionist metaphysics, truth will be constituted in the correctness of propositions, and the sciences will dominate the domain of true propositions. Heidegger suggests that correctness yet says nothing on the revealing of the essence of truth which resides not in true propositions concerning entities in the world but rather in the revealing of Being as that which gives the being of beings. Heidegger's on tic/ ontological difference is made clear when he suggests, concerning technology, that the essence of technology is nothing technological. We tend to want to define technology, what it is, by pointing to a range of technological devices in order to account for them, as that which would define the class of things technological. When Heidegger suggests that the essence of technology is "Enframing" he means that the essence of technology is a mode of Being that reveals whatever is in terms of an instrumental stockpiling of things for production. That is, technology's essence is the isness of beings in modernity's epoch of

the forgetting of Being. The forgetting of Being is a forgetting of-asking the question of what gives the fundamental frameworks such that human being is the becoming being of the revealing of whatever *is.*

But first, we need to get a sense of the proximity of the proximal as the proper in Heidegger, particularly when he is most decisive about the severance of the relation between humanism and metaphysics. *Dasein's* relation co beings will be neither representation nor interpretation. *Dasein,* who is not "man," is the privileged entity or being in the sense that only *Dasein* has a 'capacity' to receive the revealing of the Being of beings. Hence, as Derrida (1982: 127) stresses, Heidegger will privilege the absolute proximity of the questioning being to itself, "manifested to the being and in the being that *we* are." To ask this question *is* an entity's mode of Being. Hence, *Dasein's* Being is its absolute proximity to its auto-interrogation of the question of being. We again need to emphasise, *Dasein* is not a subjective consciousness. Heidegger's radicality lies in the fact chat this proximity is prior to what the metaphysical predicate "human" might name. Heidegger makes this clear precisely by complicating the question of distance and proximity. He suggests that ontically *Dasein* is chat which is closest to us. That is, as a question of being in the world of things, self-sameness, identity is that which is closest, as any subjectivism would impute. We are it. Yet, ontologically *Dasein* is that which is farthest. We see here chat Heidegger makes a categorical distinction between the thinking of man, which humanism and metaphysics have co-joined, and thinking the essence of man. The essence of man is not ontically derivable, and would not be recognised in metaphysical humanism. Derrida (1982: 127-8):

> Beyond the common closure of humanism and metaphysics, Heidegger's thought will be guided by the motif of Being as presence - understood in a more originary sense than in the metaphysical and antic determinations of presence as the present - and by the motif of the proximity of Being to the essence of man.

Proximity, the question of the near and the far, becomes Heidegger's crucial motif. It is important to emphasise that this proximity, distance, distantiation of distance or de-distancing, repeated motifs throughout Heidegger's chinking, are not antic distancing, calculable distancing, distancing for which we would ultimately have recourse to the jurisdictions of science, truth as correctness. Yet this proximity, and the opening of the question suggests that for Heidegger the thinking of Being remains a thinking of man, a kind of re-evaluation or revalorisation of the essence of man. And we recognise that what is most threatening for Heidegger in the forgetting of Being is the essence of man. And this is no more so than in his account of the extension of metaphysics and technology. Metaphysics and technology are productive of the inhuman, and particularly so in their relation to language, their violence to language: "The widely and rapidly spreading devastation of language not only undermines aesthetic and moral responsibility in every use of language; it arises from a threat to the essence of humanity" (Derrida, 1982: 128).

Fragmentary Acts: questioning concerning the borders of style(s)

We have conflated Blanchot and Heidegger to reveal something about Heidegger's thinking lodged in his writing in the essay "The Question Concerning Technology" (1977) and, further reduced an ontological engagement with Being's essence via the motif of proximity (Heidegger) and pure passivity (Blanchot) that are respectively central for both writers. In such a move, that orientates a reader to read in such a way these random connections, this writer is always in her doing, re-membering. Through remembering Heidegger's first words in his essay (which shall be recounted shortly), this writer has played, even toyed, with his language to reveal something of the divide (or distance) between an ontological and antic engagement in the act of reading any writer who celebrates thinking on the borderlines and revealing the questions that lie within the fragments of unthought thought. "The Question Concerning Technology" writes itself in such style(s) that reveals both the thought of thought that has as its stake the forgotten-ness of Being: a taken-for-grantedness *(the greatest danger)* that stores thought and yet, paradoxically, reveals the essence

(of technology), that is, Being's essence may be remembered in how it has been forgotten through a reading of *Enframing* as the *saving power* that we pay heed to. Danger and saving are conflated to reveal something of Heidegger's thinking in the pivotal difference between an on tic and ontological framework for an engagement in *essence* and *Being,* and most certainly in *language.*

Let us further complicate the complexity of Heidegger's task for writing: a writing that operates at the margins of thinking in its enumeration on ontological difference. His writing is a folding act insofar as it reveals a thinking that is close to the margins because it reflects somewhat a style of confusion and most certainly a vulnerability that hovers (even perturbates) through possible misinterpretation. And yet we have to recognise this is something central to the revelation of Heidegger's style(s) that leads toward his thinking of essence. Let us illustrate something of the paradoxical in his style(s) that reveals the emphasis he gives to those abovementioned (appropriated) words of Hölderlin. We have already alluded to the metaphorical account of appropriation at work to reveal something in terms of *Enframing.* We have not up until now directly asked if it is an intentional act of appropriation for this purpose. And this is somewhat ridiculous as a quest in a course towards certainty, when intentionality is thought of as knowable and correct. We must remember Blanchot's *récit* and the untruth of truth that comes with any appearance of knowing-for-certain. To ask such intentionality denies a Blanchotian *unavowable community* that this writing has attempted to co-join with Heidegger's. However, this vulnerability, this uncertainty that Heidegger feels for language and its devastation is most certainly revealed with his use of Hölderlin's poetic language coupled with the somewhat contradictory revelation of his law of philosophy's genre. Heidegger clearly states that Holderlin's poetry is certainly not philosophy:

> All philosophical thinking - and precisely the most rigorous and prosaic - is in itself poetic. It nonetheless never springs from the art of poetry. A work of poetry, a work like Hölderlin's hymns, can for its part be thoughtful in the highest degree. It is nonetheless never philosophy (Heidegger, 1991: 73).

Heidegger here is clearly demarcating the laws of poetry's and philosophy's genres. Philosophy has the possibility to take from poetry but the reverse cannot be said of poetry's ability to move into the philosophical realm. So what does it mean for us to read Heidegger's Hölderlin on these terms in his essay? A certain adherence to the law of genre is upheld, that is, philosophy is itself poetic. But we would like also to place emphasis on Heidegger's hovering, his vulnerability, what amounts to the breaking of borderlines so that his style marks a writing on the margins of the law of genres. We are not to ignore Hölderlin's words, for they are pivotal in his text. They mark a turning - a paradox - that distances us so that a revealing of the essence of technology might be thought. And yet as we quiver now at the knowledge that Heidegger saw nothing philosophical in the genre of poetry because he has so immediately drawn on its offerings, the warning in privileged form (almost archaic form) is revealed. Heidegger is terrified by the devastation of language and all this could mean for 'man's' essence. The default of course is that he has lit up his own workshop through an obvious deferral to the genre of poetry. A workshop flooded with anxiety over misrecognition. We do not draw out this conundrum to make light-work of Heidegger's own fallibility but rather to draw on the revelation of paradoxical offerings located in the styles that are always in the plural for destruction and remembrance to occur. Heidegger appropriates and in doing so offers a multiplicity of readings and problematics central to his philosophical concerns.

Acts of Remembrance: plural writings eventing essence

And now let us return to follow up on the conscious act of remembrance that has traced some of the chinking through this paper, let us return to chose earliest words that we promised to return to. We would also like to read these first words as both a warning in Heidegger's chinking of how one muse pay heed to *language as the indwelling of Dasein in Being.* Language for Heidegger is a revealing of *Dasein's* essence in Being in its continual passage-making or *enduring as presence* and so we recall within an act of vigilance these lines:

Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary (Heidegger, 1977: 3).

And so is it not the case that within this paper we have picked on certain isolated sentences and topics in order to account for something of Heidegger's revealing of Being in "The Question Concerning Technology", and might we add chat this is the paradox of any commentary that also performs with the styles of a writer's language together with the ontic arrest or sentencing of phrases etc to surface the enduring as presence of language itself. That is to say, an ontological engagement in language chat Heidegger might encourage. And so to conclude in/with/through language (but what else is there - except language always already pluralised, pulverised, disseminated, with no border constituting the signified - but then would we name *that* language?) the styles that we alluded to earlier as the coming together of writers of *some writings,* let us draw on another's thoughts, which is to say another's writings, styles, types and fonts that may in some way, in a summary fashion, interlace all of the motifs that have been discussed in our attempt to say something about the unthought thought, and what this does in its eventing of the essence of Being, language and what is always remembered via what has been forgotten.

We have deliberately cited in isolation fragments of text in Heidegger and Blanchot to draw on what it could mean to read their writing in the margins of the law of genres. In doing so what has been emphasised is how each writer refuses closure of any one style, or that writing, as its conditions of possibility, is the borderline crossings or faultlines of styles. Separation-reparation, that is the condition of the spacings of writing's scripture, happens on faultlines, slippages of groundings, giving way of foundations. In his conclusion to "The Ends of Man" (1982) and in relation to Heidegger's styles, Derrida offers the plurality that deconstruction's dissemination gives (as in the giving of an embankment, the undermining of solid ground). As always, there is the undecidability that makes decision the faulty necessity of living, and as we see, or read, a Nietzschean mask suffixes or suffocates the dilemma of the leap (or is it caesura) Heidegger would always want to make out of metaphysics. And perhaps we would encounter Blanchot, hands tied between the gesture or gesticulation as an addendum to the vocal and the throat gripped in the muffling of the voice.

Under a heading "strategic bet" Derrida suggests two choices, two strategies of deconstruction, two strategies questioning being human. One maintains the familiar terrain, repeating founding concepts but using what is already available against the edifice itself. This would suggest we can not get outside of metaphysics except by using the most privileged concepts of metaphysics, particularly the conceptual pair inside/outside itself. Hence we deconstruct from an inside that complicates the very conception of containment. The second strategy suggests we make an abrupt break, change terrains, yet only to find language reinstates the oldest concepts on our new terrain. This paleo-nomic effect effaces the radicality of any rupture, restores interiority at the point of an exterior. On these two, Derrida suggests:

... choice between these two forms of deconstruction cannot be simple and unique. A new writing must weave and interlace these two motifs. Which amounts to saying that one must speak several languages and produce several texts at once ... what we need, perhaps, as Nietzsche said, is a change of 'style'; and if there is style, Nietzsche reminded us, it must be *plural* (1982: 135).

Between these two strategies we may read the plural styles of Heidegger never done with the resourcing of metaphysics, never tiring of the leap out of metaphysics. We may yet read here in the plural, Nietzsche's Heidegger and Heidegger's Nietzsche. But then, we might ask, does this plurality of Heidegger/Nietzsche yet bear a proper name - perhaps the name Blanchot?

Notes

1. Consider here Blanchot's (1999c) "The Song of the Sirens" (pp. 443-450), a text that probes what it was chat Ulysses heard when tied to the mast in order to hear the captivating rapture of the sirens. Blanchot suggests that the captivating reverie was that the sirens were silent.

2. From Maurice Blanchot's text (19996) "The Madness of the Day'', Derrida draws on the double affirmation, the *yes, yes;* an inherent stylistic and rhetorical motif in Blanchot's writing, which traverses across borderlines, both celebrating the laws of literary writing (its genres, forms, types, generals etc) and their dissimulating possibilities. A double celebration if you like of affirming the law of laws. For further reading see Derrida, (1992) "The Law of Genre". For further reference to Blanchot's notion of the *Unavowable Community* see Blanchot (1988) *The Unavowable Community.* (P Joris, Trans.), Barrytown, N.Y.: Stationhill Press.

3. Derrida, J. (1992). "The Law of Genre" (pp. 251-252). In reference to this chapter Derrida writes on the nature of law in respect to literature and uses, in particular, Blanchot's writing *"La folie du jour",* which translates as "The Madness of the Day" and was also titled both *"Un recit?"* and *"Un recit"* in two earlier and separate publications. Derrida draws attention to this work for its exemplary powerful polysemic and disseminal game, a game inasmuch as it toys with the laws of writing and their genre formations (conflating at one point the notion of gender, law and genre). Here the notion of play is very important for Derrida's writing (on Blanchot's writing) as it is a move of dissemination which encapsulates the seductive nature of law(s) i.e. law's desire that we are in someway party to "its" structures (in positions of transgression as much as compliance), and yet these structures have boundaries too that enter into the realm of fiction whereby they are dependent on the figures of "truth", on a rhetoric of presence as though in the *madness* of the day one can always account *(recit)* reciprocally. Now here there is a law generic to law, a genre that writes itself as "truth", a truth that comes out in the broad light of day to show to its subjects the way, its way, it's a way that passes by the event of reciprocity to evidence the madness of its day-light blinding justice. And so Blanchot reveals, in his madness, his being seduced by the law (for he is seduced by "her" revelation) as much to be affirmed by the paradox of the law's amorphous qualities - a double affirmation "who never told life to be quiet or death to go away'' (Blanchot, "The Madness of the Day", (19996: 7) and Derrida, "The Law of Genre" (1992: 244.)

4. Derrida (1992: 249). He wanted a face-to-face encounter that was impossible etc.

5. To be clearer on these figures of darkness and light: firstly, an engagement with the relations between ontic and ontological approaches must be acknowledged insofar as for any ontic engagement in the world there must always be (have been) the possibility for an ontological horizon and the 'giving' of Being accordingly. And, secondly, we would also wish to do some further clarification on the issue of "light" that enumerates succinctly the doubling (ontological/ontic) of our reading here in terms of how our paradoxical engagement with Heidegger's writing and thinking may be poignantly framed. We take our lead from Derrida's essay (1978) "Violence and Metaphysics" (84-92). In a section of this chapter sub-headed "The Violence of Light", Derrida emphasises that philosophies of ontology and phenomenology are philosophies of violence. He focuses on Levinas and Heidegger here as examples of the most radical thinkers of alterity and pluralism in regard to the essence of Being and "truth" of beings. This violence is done through their language with respect to their non-respect for Being and meaning of the Other, and returning the Other to a totalitarianism of the Same. With respect to Heidegger's thinking, Derrida draws on a formal logic at the heart of his writing, a form of non-alterity or non-contradiction that is revealed in Heidegger's notion of *absolute solitude.* Here Heidegger is referring to time as being whereby temporality is ecstasy (being is outside of itself); a move towards a pluralism which does not fuse into unity and in this respect he is breaking away from Plato and Parmenides (Being as object ... reflected by light (truth)), chat is a move toward multiplicity and alterity as the *absolute solitude* of the existent (being) in its existence (being's Being), and the relationship to the Other arises out of this Solitude. So, we here detect the complication of Heid egger's alterity that ends at the "truth" of the Same. Platonic light as the metaphor for truth is more apparently ontic in the sense that it is located outside of the subject via the subject's theoretical objectivity and thus possession of truth for (and in) things operates at the logic of possession: to know is to grasp and possess truth. Heidegger's is much more radical than his predecessors as illustrated above by his ontologically different engagement with, and not for, existence in existents. Derrida draws out the 'trouble' for Heidegger in his logic of thinking via *logos* to pose the complication at

stake in the posing of a questioning that asks: What language would free itself of this metaphor of light? Even a metaphysics of the face as the epiphany of the Other is radically complicated.

6. This face-to-face is not Blanchot's, Levinas's, nor Heidegger's Ontological notion but rather should be read in its difference, i.e., an ontic engagement remembers nothing in terms of an ontological engagement of Being and the forgotteness of Being.

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