Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophy as a way of life

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ABSTRACT
The works of Simone de Beauvoir are undergoing a considerable revival in philosophy after several decades of rejection and exclusion from the philosophical canon. The reclamation of de Beauvoir comes largely from the work of women philosophers with subsequent publishing and retranslation of her works into English. We can note now, at least: her release from under the philosophical shadow of Jean-Paul Sartre, her independence, an original approach to philosophy through the notion of a philosophy of lived experience and its exposition through literature, and her original contribution to existentialist ethics especially in Pyrrhus and Cineas (1944) and The Ethics of Ambiguity (1947). In this paper I will introduce de Beauvoir, first with a brief biography and, second, with some of her works through those topics. Apart from literature and philosophy, de Beauvoir (1908–86) wrote many autobiographies, biographies, diaries, and histories, for journals/magazines and the press. Much of this writing was included in her novels. Thus for her and Jean-Paul Sartre philosophy was a way of life.

Introduction

Men have been born, they have suffered and they have died. (Shahnameh Ferdousi, [935–1020])

Man is not born but becomes free. (Alfred Fouillée, [1838–1912])

Man cannot escape philosophy because he cannot escape his freedom, which implies questioning and refusal of the given. (Simone de Beauvoir)

After several decades of rejection and exclusion from the philosophical canon the works of Simone de Beauvoir are undergoing a considerable revival in philosophy, mainly because of the work of women philosophers (see Simons, 2004). Since de Beauvoir’s death in 1986 this ‘renaissance’ has in part been caused by the release of documents by her executor and adopted daughter, Sylvie le Bon de Beauvoir, and a subsequent publishing and retranslation of her works into English (See Simons, 2004, Intro.). We can note now, at least: her release from under the philosophical shadow of Jean-Paul Sartre, her independence, an original approach to philosophy through the notion of a philosophy of lived experience and its exposition through literature, and her original contribution to existentialist ethics especially in Pyrrhus and Cineas (PC: de Beauvoir, 1944) and The Ethics of Ambiguity (EA: de Beauvoir, 1947). In this paper I will introduce de Beauvoir, first with a brief biography, and second with her works through those topics. I also provide, at the end, a bibliography of her works (including translations). Apart from literature and philosophy, de Beauvoir (1908–86) wrote many autobiographies, biographies, diaries and histories, and for journals/magazines and the press. Much of this writing was included in her novels. She seems to have held that experience could be described, told or written down truthfully, because there was a
relationship between actual experience and the text. In some way the text was ‘logically’ related to the experience, and experience was thereby itself true. Whilst experience might be real it is not obvious however that it is true or that it contains the grains of truth. It is propositions that are true, not experience (see Dreske, 1995). However there is little doubt that if de Beauvoir believed that there was some sort of logical relationship between an experience and a proposition (about that experience), she was also determined to see her life through her ‘own eyes’. As Francis and Gontier say (1987: xv):

De Beauvoir gave a certain order to the story of her life; she structured her narrative and restructured her life. We came to realise that she could not accept easily and without pain the reality that her story would be retold by others and seen through eyes other than her own… “My memoirs are not the bible!” And on that we agreed; in her autobiography, particularly in *Memoires of a Dutiful Daughter* and *The Prime of Life*, de Beauvoir had taken licence with aspects of her personality and her life and in fact created a work of art.

So, with de Beauvoir we have a mélange of biographical facts, memories, reported experiences in memoires etc., the experiences of characters in her novels (often her own), and her philosophy. Collectively these should be seen as a work of art. By 1948 de Beauvoir had moved from a certain early indifference to matters around her (in her search for happiness), to a belief that freedom could be attained in certain contexts through what she saw as a philosophy of lived experience (see below). The aphorisms above might be said to represent these phases. But, as she said, in attaining freedom (quoted in Simons, 2004: 2):

> Every living step is a philosophical choice and the ambition of a philosophy worthy of the name is to be a way of life that brings its justification with itself.

**Some biographical details**

Simone Lucie Ernestine Marie Bertrand de Beauvoir was born in Montparnasse, Paris in 1908. Her family had aristocratic pretensions, but after WWI it fell upon hard times and Simone, without a dowry and therefore the possibility of an arranged marriage, was forced to prepare for a career. Her career, she realised, would depend upon her studies and her intelligence (Francis & Gontier, 1987: 46). In spite of the austere circumstances of her upbringing she “said repeatedly that her earliest childhood was ‘very, very happy’” (Francis & Gontier, 1987: 21). She was initially educated in a conservative catholic school where she met her great friend of those early years Zaza. By the age of 18 she had began to write serious fiction, and Zaza features as Anne in the early collection of short stories, written in 1935–37, but which was initially rejected and remained unpublished until 1979 (translated as *When Things of the Spirit Come First* [WTS], 1982). These stories are concerned with young women philosophy students encountering life and rejecting the bourgeois values of their parents and families. (It is Anne’s [Zaza’s] inability to accept those values and the expectations of her mother that are to contribute to her very early death). But they also involve attacks upon, and herald de Beauvoir’s rejection of, philosophy as involving the construction and application of abstract philosophical theories. But that is not a rejection of philosophy itself by de Beauvoir because what was needed was a different approach to philosophy. For her, philosophy was to be based upon a notion of personal lived experience.

De Beauvoir was awarded her baccalaureate in 1925, in Latin and literature with honours, and in mathematics with highest honours. Advised by her father de Beauvoir then pursued licences in literature, philosophy and mathematics at the École Normale Libre in Neuilly, where she was influenced by Mme. Mercier and encouraged by her to pursue philosophy. Her degree in philosophy was completed in 1928. Next she completed her thesis whilst also preparing for the agrégation (licence to teach). She passed her agrégation (the youngest woman to do so) and commenced teaching in lycées in 1929 (Latin initially, then literature, but philosophy by 1932 [Bair, 1990: 180]). Her teaching contract was terminated in 1943 by the Nazi administration, and though officially reinstated after the war, she did not return to formal teaching.
In her literature, WTS was completed in 1937 but not published until 1979. Her first novel, *She Came to Stay* (SCCTS) was eventually published in 1943 because of WWII, but it was completed much earlier. This was followed by *The Blood of Others* (TBO, 1943), *All Men are Mortal* (AMM, 1946), and *The Mandarins* (M, 1954) which won the prestigious Prix Goncourt and thereby secured her final independence. She wrote one performed drama, *Who Shall Die* (WSD, 1945). Her writing was then to become more personal, and socially, politically and historically contextual – the memoirs/autobiographies/diaries/letters – and her writings on America, China and Algeria. In philosophy there were PC (1944), EA (1947) and *The Second Sex* (SS, 1949), selected by *Time* in their list of the one hundred best books of the twentieth century.

Sartre who died in 1980, and de Beauvoir who died in 1986, are buried together in the Montparnasse cemetery.

**De Beauvoir and philosophy**

De Beauvoir claimed on many occasions from the late 1940s that she was not a philosopher. Was she lying or was there a sense of ‘philosophy’, or some type of philosophy, from which she wished to be dissociated? Certainly she did not consider herself either to be an academic philosopher, or a philosopher in the sense that she acknowledged that Sartre was, e.g., in his *Being and Nothingness* (BN) and in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* (CDR). This is the type of philosophy which constructs universal philosophical theories, with abstract concepts organised in a systematic manner. From her early writings, particularly in WTS, she is clearly opposed to such constructed abstract systems, and argues against them. (See also her arguments against Kantian philosophy SCCTS.)

She does, however, state her position on philosophy in the longish article, ‘Literature and Metaphysics’ (LM, first published in 1946 as ‘Littérature et Métaphysique’). That philosophical position can be explained by considering two types of scientists (this is her approach). She distinguishes between abstract general theorists, like Einstein, and researchers who are either trying to establish facts or use facts to test an abstract theory. Science has need of both kinds of scientists. De Beauvoir compares an abstract systematiser like Kant or the Sartre of the *Critique* with a scientific theorist like Einstein. She compares her philosophy with the work of a researcher like Lavoisier in trying to improve the quality of both French munitions and the water of Paris, in the late eighteenth century. Lavoisier would have been trying to test for things like phlogiston (unsuccessfully) and then new ‘things’ which seemed to be in the gills of fish in the Seine – i.e., oxygen, a gas, and a new kind of ‘thing’.

De Beauvoir saw herself as a scientific researcher, like Lavoisier, trying to establish certain facts about the human condition, upon which more general and abstract philosophical theories would or could be based, or which could be used to falsify any such established philosophical theories (as she does in the early writings, e.g. WTS). If the researcher in science and the theoretician in science are both considered as being importantly connected in science, and as scientists, then the question which de Beauvoir asks often is, what is the philosophical relation between the facts of the real world of lived experience and abstract general philosophy? Not very much in terms of academic philosophy, would be de Beauvoir’s answer. This leads her to say that much of (academic) philosophy is located in the ideal world; for example freedom is discussed in various ideal situations within abstract theories, and particular freedom in the real world is ignored. Hence her approach to SS.

It is the real world in which women live where philosophical questions must be posed, and her answers severely criticise idealist philosophies, which probably do not even take account of how men live in the world, let alone women. Abstract idealist philosophy ignores the necessary groundwork, or the philosophy of lived experience, and is a continual target for de Beauvoir, who possessed a more personal quest for philosophy. Therefore in *The Second Sex* (1989) she starts and works from a woman’s point of view, as she had so much earlier with the young women in WTS.
I shall describe the world in which women must live; and thus we shall be able to envisage the
difficulties in their way as, endeavouring to make their escape from the sphere hitherto assigned
them, they aspire to full membership in the human race. (de Beauvoir, 1989: xxxv)

De Beauvoir, Sartre and She Came to Stay (SCTS)

De Beauvoir and Sartre

Simone de Beauvoir had been almost totally excluded from the philosophical canon until the 1980s
and a revival and reinterpretation of her work by mainly feminist philosophers. At best her
philosophy is either said to be derivative from that of Sartre, or a literary interpretation of Sartre, or
it is described away as “a kind of footnote to Sartre” (Kruks, 1990: 84). A major and early exception
however was Hazel Barnes (1959: 4): “De Beauvoir is more than Sartre’s interpreter.” Barnes also
challenged the full import of the charges which have been made against Sartre, stating that “[i]t is
not obligatory to try to downgrade Sartre in order to praise Beauvoir …” (1997: 187–188).

De Beauvoir aided and abetted in this general interpretation in a number of sources, creating a
myth about her own contributions to philosophy which is being dispelled by feminist
philosophers. However this received interpretation of her work was not questioned until the
publication, posthumously by her adopted daughter Sylvie le Bon de Beauvoir in 1990, of her Letters
to Sartre (LS). A careful reading of her letters to Sartre (1990) and the war diaries during the period
between October 1939 and January 1941, when she was writing SCTS (completed in 1940–41 but
not published until 1943), and the philosophical import of the first three chapters, especially the first
eight pages of this, her first published novel. But BO is also important here.

De Beauvoir recognised in her own writing that there was a sense in which she may not be seen
as a philosopher for she did not write academic philosophy. Unlike Sartre, whose philosophical
works were written abstractly (though not his novels and plays), and who was seeking a grand
totalising philosophical system, de Beauvoir did not want to write so as to present philosophical
ideas in either an abstract manner or as divorced from actual or possible human experience.
Literature presented to her a way of relating philosophical ideas to experience, particularly as it
presented a way of expressing her own experiences as part of a general philosophical framework.
Her novels can be seen as metaphysical novels, as presenting a fictional narrative in which her own
experience is drawn heavily upon, but through a philosophical or metaphysical grill (Ascher, 1991).
For de Beauvoir this meant insight into her own life as, in so far as she was a philosopher, this
involved I believe (philosophical) work upon the self. But, further, her approach involves also a
rejection of academic philosophy (cf. the rejections of academic forms of philosophy by
Wittgenstein and Foucault). As Hazel Barnes says (1959: 122):

... the analysis of human relationships and personalities is more philosophical than psychological.
Perhaps de Beauvoir and her fictional counterpart [Françoise in STCS] are accustomed to think in
this way about themselves and their reactions, but most people are not as metaphysically acute.
(my enclosure)

Rather than stay with the well documented sources of her independence from Sartre (Fullbrook &
Fullbrook, 1993; Simons, 2004) and her originality as a philosopher (Simons, 2004) we will look at a
number of events recorded by both de Beauvoir and Sartre when de Beauvoir was writing the final
drafts of STCS. This manuscript (published in 1943) pre-dated Sartre’s writing of BN. The
philosophical issues that de Beauvoir held by the writing of STCS, independently and prior to Sartre’s
adoption of them, were that freedom was not absolute (as is the case with women and, thereby,
challenging Sartre’s notion of authenticity), and that the Other was not always alien. Indeed the
Other was necessary for the ethical establishment of the self as a subject and not merely as an object
and as an affirmer of the subject’s self knowledge (i.e. as a subject).
There is no doubt that Sartre read the manuscript of SCTS. Nor is there any doubt that this manuscript was in an advanced state – almost a final draft when he saw it in late 1939/early 1940. The sources for these comments are to be found in her own LS14 published posthumously, and in The Prime of Life (1960). De Beauvoir, who had published Sartre’s letters,15 was often asked about her letters to him, but claimed that they were lost. Whether or not this was the truth,16 they were discovered by her adopted daughter Sylvie Le Bon de Beauvoir in November 1986,17 and published in 1990.

The evidence that Sartre was both aware of the manuscript and its advanced state, and that he did read it, are to be found in de Beauvoir’s letters to Sartre from at least 11 October 1939 to March 1940. This was the period of the phoney war and the letters until February are written in anticipation of Sartre’s leave in Paris (this eventually occurred between 4 and 15 February). They cover not just the intimate details and gossip of daily life, nor just the expressions of lovers waiting to be reunited, but also details of her work on her diaries and on SCTS (she was punctilious with diary entries).

By end October 1939 it has clearly been written: “There’s lots to redo. But I’m pleased all the same ...” (de Beauvoir, LS: 111); “... we’ll have to devote a few hours to reading it, since I’ll need your advice so much” (LS: 112). On 14 October and 18 October she is still working on it and on 20 October she notes that Sartre approves of her plan for the novel. At 25 October she said: “I’ve got the whole novel so clearly in my head now that stopping at each chapter irritates me. I can’t decide whether or not to work on larger chunks, and proceed as quickly as possible right to the end, then go back over everything in detail” (LS: 139).

In the letters of 9, 15, 16 and 22 November she is working on the novel, “driving myself pretty hard” (LS: 174) and not wanting to lose the momentum (LS: 179). By 2 December she is talking about the huge task the redrafting has been (LS: 192) and on 14 December of flagging (LS: 210), even though it is going so well (LS: 212). By 16 December and in anticipation of Sartre’s leave she can say: “My little judge, you’ll read a big wad of it in January” (LS: 216), though his leave was to be postponed until February. There were said to be 60 pages in final draft, with another 300 pages drafted, in her letter of 29 December (LS: 234). By 3 January 1940 the final draft figure seems to be 80 pages and as she comments: “I’ve the impression it has improved a hundred per cent ... But I need your opinion” (LS: 240).

On 6 January she believes that she has fifteen good working days until his leave (LS: 245). The anticipation of being united is continuously expressed but so too is her need for him to read her work and, indeed for her to read what he was doing: “How impatient I am to read you, and for you to read me, my little one. That’s what makes separation most frustrating for me” (LS: 247). She must have worked well because by 17 January she believes that she will have at least 250 pages for him to read (LS: 258). On 19 January she says that she has found his decision to recast the novel “extremely sensible” (LS: 261). The picture which emerges then is that prior to Sartre’s arrival in Paris on 4 February 1940, de Beauvoir had done a substantial revision of SCTC. This, her first novel, was to be published in 1943. But it had been begun in 1937. The charge is that Sartre’s concepts of authenticity and the social other, which feature so crucially in BN and the CDR, respectively, are traceable to SCTS. BN was published in 194318 and CDR in 1960.19

According to Fullbrook and Fullbrook (1993: 97) it is no secret that Sartre wrote BN with de Beauvoir by his side, upstairs in the Café Flore (one of their regular haunts). In a life jointly dedicated to writing and to one another this is hardly surprising. It is clear that Sartre knew the material that de Beauvoir had prepared for SCTS but, equally, it is clear that she was working with Sartre on BN. It is clear also that he read that material whilst on leave in February 1940. Both books were published in 1943.
De Beauvoir and the philosophy of lived experience

De Beauvoir’s earlier writings are sometimes caught by the term ‘the metaphysical novels’. This is for two reasons at least. First there is the notion of the self: who am I, and what am I. What is the relationship between self and Other: I see myself as a subject but am I merely an object for the other; do I need an other in order to know that I am a subject and not merely an object for Other(s)? Second de Beauvoir is investigating whether certain philosophical abstract theories stand up in the real world: are they sufficiently rich or even adequate to describe the lived experience of human beings. This is her view that her concern is with actual lived experience and with the philosophy of lived experience, whereby she sees philosophy based upon lived experience as a test of abstract universal philosophical theories. She sees herself as being like a scientific researcher testing abstract theories (see Holveck, 2002: 16).

In WTS she applies the experiences of young female philosophy students to more abstract bourgeois and social theories, those held by the student’s parents and which are to be found wanting. The answers which she gives in SCTS are neither that of the Hegelian theories of the Other, the early Kantian inspired theory of love reconciling reason and lust, nor the later reading of Hegel by Kojève, which essentially replaces love with desire. In this source neither, in de Beauvoir’s view, is adequate to catch the reality of human experience.

The term ‘metaphysical novel’ catches at least these works of de Beauvoir: When Things of the Spirit Come First, She Came to Stay, The Blood of Others, All Men are Mortal, and, The Mandarins. However I will be concentrating now on She Came to Stay. A metaphysical novel expresses a singular lived experience and a philosophy of lived experience. In the order of the listed titles de Beauvoir describes the lived experiences of Françoise, Jean, Regina and Anne (though in The Mandarins there are more major figures than Anne). She, Zaza and Sartre amongst others, appear in a number of guises in these novels.

SCTS, according to Holveck (2002: 68), “is a clear example of de Beauvoir’s use of fiction to question the evidence for a philosophical system.” For de Beauvoir then, like falsifiability in science, an abstract theory needs to be abandoned if it cannot explain and illuminate lived human experience. In WTS, Marguerite is to reject bourgeois principles and values (spirituality goes early in the chapter). But she does not replace them in the chapter, because she “had to rediscover everything myself – furthermore not everything is clear.” (de Beauvoir, 1982: 212) According to Holveck STS can be seen as an attempt “to live full-time in Marguerite’s new world … free from all inherited values” (Holveck, 2002: 68).

But there are cobwebs in CTS. Leon Brunschvicg, a former teacher of de Beauvoir, and whom de Beauvoir had initially ‘followed’ but had argued strongly against in WTS, appears in Françoise’s and Pierre’s (Simone and Sartre) arguments against Elizabeth’s views on art – Pierre’s sister. (The arguments against Brunschvicg have been said to hold together the short stories in WTS [Holveck, 2002: 46]). Not only are there remnants of Brunschvicg in their arguments against Elizabeth’s views on art, but they are also to be found in their views on morality and their own relationship. Kantian ideas on morality and early Hegelian (Kantian influenced) ideas on love occur also. But there are two versions of Hegel on love. The first is that love resolves the opposition in human life between reason/law and lust. The other reading of Hegel is that of Alexandre Kojève (1969) where love is replaced by desire, according to Holveck (2002: xx). So philosophical systems have not entirely disappeared.

Existentialism

De Beauvoir has normally been classified as an existentialist. I am not sure that this classification is very helpful. Francis and Gontier make this general point (1987: 246):
The misunderstood word ‘existentialism’ was also the latest, most fashionable word. Sartre and de Beauvoir were on their way to becoming the leading authorities on a philosophy that was riding like a tide on all sides and seeping into the least expected corners of Parisian Life. Neither Sartre nor de Beauvoir wanted a label, and this irritated them as much as any other. ‘I don’t know what existentialism is,’ Sartre declared during a symposium organized by the Dominicans. But their protests were in vain. ‘In the end, we took the epithet that everyone used for us and used it for own purposes,’ de Beauvoir wrote.

It is more helpful, I believe, to see them as part of an anti-nihilistic ‘movement’ which started, arguably, from André Malraux’s La Condition Humaine in 1933. In a troubled area, where literature and philosophy appear to meet, there were a number of anti-nihilistic French writers. John Cruikshank identifies a number of these, including Jean-Paul Sartre, Samuel Beckett, Simone de Beauvoir and Albert Camus (see further Cruikshank, 1962: 3)

De Beauvoir’s PC is an assertion of de Beauvoir’s position that to act is the essence of life. One’s ability to act is not equal but to act was to free freedom. EA is concerned with how to choose how to act in life in situations which are always fundamentally ambiguous (contrast Camus who saw life as fundamentally absurd). Sometimes she is said to have written the existentialist ethics. But is this so? We have seen her denial of this ascription of ‘existentialism’ but there are stronger grounds for this denial and rejection.

According to Donald Vandenberg (1979: 168), existentialism:

... seems nihilistic, forever dwelling on the negative aspects of life. It is concerned with meaninglessness, homelessness, powerlessness, facelessness, normlessness, truthlessness, solitariness, and even with nothingness. It discusses contingency, accident, purposelessness, restlessness, uneasiness, and the modern malaise of the spirit. It analyses the moods of boredom, loneliness, nausea, anxiety, anguish, dread and despair. It examines the phenomena of fault, guilt suffering, tragedy and death. In fact, Camus claimed that philosophy begins with reflections on suicide … The gloom and doom, however is but half the story.

Vandenberg tells only part of Camus’ approach to nihilism which, for him, was not an end but a beginning. Whether or not the list captures what is meant by existentialism, it certainly covers what might better be called nihilism. For de Beauvoir ‘gloom and doom’ were considerably less than half the story and, if she must be classified, she would be more correctly placed in the group of writers who were anti-nihilism. Perhaps such classifications are less useful than at first sight they might appear.

**Conclusion**

In this paper I have tried to provide a general introduction to Simone de Beauvoir. I believe that she is not merely an historical figure, a person who wrote, but no longer has anything to offer to modern debates. She still has something to contribute to discussions and/or assumptions about what it is to be a human being, including being a young human being, and being a woman, about our relations to other human beings, and about how to lead our lives. In her case she has much to offer still to these debates.20

I cannot prescribe studying de Beauvoir to others, but I would suggest that they might step into the ‘waters’ themselves – if they believe themselves to be free.

**Notes**

1. I take these aphorisms from Margaret A. Simons (2004), (Ed.) Simone de Beauvoir: philosophical writings, Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press. They could be said to represent three epochs in her life: (i) an early apolitical stance in the search for happiness; (ii) the development of her philosophy of lived experience; (iii) her later political and philosophical stance towards the world.
2. For example, see Edwards (1967), and Kaufmann (1956). To be fair Edwards mentions de Beauvoir's *Ethics of Ambiguity* but says only that it is important in its own right.

3. Her work on feminism did not, of course, fade away.

4. Especially important here was the work of (the late) Kate Fullbrook and Edward Fullbrook (1993), *Simone de Beauvoir and John-Paul Sartre*, New York: Basic Books.

5. De Beauvoir’s references are listed in the *References* section according to the dates of my copies of her works, with cross references to the original French publications. In the *Bibliography* (not exhaustive) they are listed in French according to the date of publication, with mainly the earliest British or North American translations in English added, where possible. These do not always equate with dates of the English translations in the *References* section. Not everything has been translated into English.

6. I draw here upon Francis’ and Gontier’s *Simone de Beauvoir*, 1987. I am grateful to my friend Adele Frost for leaving this on her bookshelves for my Christmas, 1993, reading.

7. On Zaza see Francis and Gontier (1987: 39–44). She was born Elizabeth Le Coin and when referred to directly in texts by de Beauvoir is called Elizabeth Mabille.

8. I take the following details on her education from Francis and Gontier (1987: 48–55).

9. Although the prize was extremely small sales etc. increased enormously. *The Mandarins* and *The Second Sex* were both placed on the Index of Prohibited Books by the Holy Office in 1956. See further Francis & Gontier (1987: 254–256).

10. Lavoisier had no metaphysical theory which permitted him to recognise a gas, because gases were not things.

11. For example, she is not mentioned in Walter Kaufmann’s *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (1956). In Paul Edwards’ comprehensive philosophical encyclopedia, *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1967), the only mention is of her *Ethics of Ambiguity* (1948), which is merely said to be important in its own right. In Christine Howells (1992) *The Cambridge Companion to Sartre*, she is mentioned once only and that for providing biographical material on Sartre’s reading of Husserl. She is not in Suber’s pages on philosophy on the Internet.

12. For example Margaret Simons, 1995.


16. Some argue that she did not publish them because it would have destroyed the myth that she was intellectually dependent upon Sartre (e.g. Fullbrook & Fullbrook, 1993). Sylvie states that de Beauvoir believed them lost “to the end” (*Letters to Sartre*, xi).


Title Abbreviations

Simone de Beauvoir

AMM  All Men Are Mortal
BO   The Blood of Others
EA   The Ethics of Ambiguity
LS   Letters to Sartre
M    The Mandarins
PC   Pyrrhus and Cineas
PL   The Prime of Life
SCTS She Came to Stay
SS   The Second Sex
WSD  Who Shall Die?
WTS  When Things of the Spirit Come First

Jean-Paul Sartre

BN   Being and Nothingness
CDR  Critique of Dialectical Reason

A de Beauvoir Bibliography


**References**


