

Artwork as Technics

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ABSTRACT

'Artwork as technics' opens discussion on activating aesthetics in educational contexts by arguing that we require some fundamental revision in understanding relations between aesthetics and technology in contexts where education is primarily encountered instrumentally and technologically. The paper addresses this through the writing of the French theorist of technology, Bernard Stiegler, as well as extending Stiegler's own discussion on the work of Martin Heidegger concerning the work of art and technology. Crucial to this discussion is recognition of the thinking of the late eighteenth-century German poet, Friedrich Hölderlin, on the work of Heidegger. The paper questions whether such recognition also extends crucial aspects of Stiegler's own thinking.

KEYWORDS

Stiegler, technics, Heidegger, Hölderlin, autochthony

ARTICLE HISTORY

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Introduction

This special issue of *Access*, 'Activating aesthetics', asks how 'the poetic or aesthetic' might be discovered and applied in educational scholarship and creative works. How do we activate an aesthetic sensibility? A grounding premise for this paper is that currently education is conceived, developed and practiced in overtly instrumental ways. Education is essentially conceived of as means to a broad spectrum of ends, increasingly driven by technologies that, themselves, emerge instrumentally. In this light, a call for activating an aesthetic sensibility is a call for bringing such instrumentalism into question, firstly by recognising or disclosing it and then by strategic or tactical adjustments that enable us to think pedagogical agencies poetically.

For this reason, the paper commences with introducing our most orthodox understanding of aesthetics, or poetics, which is to say the work of art derived from Kantian critique in Kant's *Critique of judgement* (1790). However, the paper asks if our most conventional and accepted understandings of the work of art, to be opposed to instrumentalizing technology and technoscience, are any longer relevant. Perhaps we need to equally ask how today we understand aesthetics and poetics. What Kant devised in terms of the moral image of the world may well have undergone a paradigm shift over the past 200 years. This paper suggests we now need to encounter a question of aesthetics, technology and education via the mediating field of ecology, that the question of the human, and *paidos*, the emerging human, is one that radically revises how we now come to understand technology's relation to aesthetics. The paper pursues this question via the work of Bernard Stiegler on technology, ecology and the human, that itself activates the work of Martin Heidegger on technology and the work of art. However, the paper commences with defining Kantian aesthetics.

The Moral Image

In the conclusion to his *Critique of practical reason* (Kant, 1997, pp. 133–134), Immanuel Kant suggests that human being possesses two realms, two possible worlds: that of the infinity of worlds within worlds, inspired by gazing at the starry sky, and that of a moral law within each human being. Radically and infinitely exterior and radically and infinitely interior, there are two possessions of the human that together construe our possibility to be. Yet, it might also be the case that it is not we who have this doubling-possessing as much as it is we who *belong* to this exteriority and interiority. It is we who are possessed by this double. For Kant, this doubling established the human as other than other beings. Kant draws a distinction between our finite animal being, as a creature that is eventually returned to the earth, and human being as intelligence, independent of the sensible world and extending to the infinite. With this distinction between a finite sensible world and an infinite intelligible world, is recognised a version of the dilemma that led Kant to formulate his notion of the *moral image* of the world. On the one hand, our reason strives for self-interested happiness as a maximum satisfaction. The pursuit of this idea leads to increasing disorder in the impossible coexistence of self-interests. On the other hand, there is the moral law as a *disinterested* order as maximum accord among all imaginable actions, an order beyond our knowledge, where a supersensible being, a deity becomes the guarantee of our happiness, no longer determinable within our self-interested will:

This enables us to accept our situation, namely, that we cannot even imagine in what our happiness could possibly consist. Our hope will now be directed toward an order beyond our knowledge—toward another dimension of our lives. Of it we know only that it must be a realm where a deity guarantees the appropriate distribution of happiness and moral merit. We have arrived at the *moral image*. (Kant, 1997; cited in Henrich, 1992, p. 21)

Kant's original understanding of the moral image of the world was transformed in the writing of his *Critique of practical reason* (1997) and *Critique of judgement* (1986), though it constituted an essential ground for his understanding of aesthetic judgement and human freedom. The work of art for Kant was, strictly speaking, without purpose, without finality or end, without rule in its making and without determinate or objective judgement in the universality of judgements of taste. Though, to be more precise, the Faculty of Judgement is nonetheless the faculty whose a priori principle is finality of nature: 'This faculty, with its concept of a finality of nature, provides us with the mediating concept between concepts of nature and the concept of freedom ...' (Kant, 1986, p. 38). As independent of all interest, judgements of taste are absolutely subjective, without cognitive determination or recourse to desire or will. Such judgements are absolutely indifferent to the question of the real existence of the world:

Now, where the question is whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know, whether we, or anyone else, are, or ever could be, concerned in the real existence of the thing, but rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or reflection). ... One must not be in the least prepossessed in favour of the real existence of the thing, but must preserve complete indifference in this respect, in order to play the part of the judge in matters of taste. (Kant, 1986, pp. 42–43)

Perhaps, and perhaps for some time now, we have come to understand the Kantian moral image—that which mediates between romantic nature and human freedom, what Kantian aesthetics sought to address especially in those things human-made that we yet call 'beautiful' and 'sublime'—under a new logic or *logos*, that of a particular *oikos* or dwelling, within the system of living things, what we currently name *ecology*. This new name for the moral image appears at that moment when *physis* and *tekhne* are inseparably written, when *tekhne* and *aesthesis* are reciprocally constituted and when *episteme* and *tekhne* emerge as technoscience. Such an *eco-aesthetic technology of nature* has emerged, on the one hand, within the panoply of critical engagements with vitalism and affect determined by both life-world phenomenology and Spinozist immanentism as counter-measures to neo-Kantian science and, on the other hand, via critical engagements with technology and technical determinism, again via legacies that are broadly phenomenological as well as Spinozist.

And, crucially, ecology, as a science of life-world systems is a pedagogy inasmuch as it at once places the human within a systemic structure of life and, as a 'moral idea' constitutes by this systemic structure regulatory procedures for guiding the human as living being. We initially turn to questions concerning technics as a way of broaching the *tekhne* of an *oikos* that houses *paidos*, the emergent human—which is to say, *anthropos* as self-showing *tekhne*.

Tekhne & Tropes

It is now 20 years since the publication, in France, of Bernard Stiegler's *Technics and time, volume 1: The fault of Epimetheus*, (1998) the first of a three-volume work on rethinking an ontology of technology and the technical object. More recently, Stiegler has embarked on another three-volume work, titled *Disbelief and Discredit*, with volume one—appearing in 2004—titled, *The decadence of industrial democracies* (2011). This latter work opens with a perspective on technological modernity that was simply not the concern of the *Technics and Time* volumes, a perspective that could be termed, in its brevity, the 'culture industries'. Stiegler emphasises that 'an industrial model of production and consumption has failed' (Stiegler, 2011, pp. 3–4), and it is necessary to radically think 'a renewed idea of this object' (4) which currently takes the form of 'structurally cultural capital' (4). Stiegler notes:

It is in the first place a matter of giving a critique of the classical industrial model that was elaborated in North America long before the hyper-industrial capitalist epoch. And yet, and principally to overcome what Marx called its 'contradictions', this classical model soon places cultural control at the heart of the process through which it pursues its development. This has not been generally understood by twentieth-century analysts of capitalism (with the possible exception of Gramsci and certainly of Adorno), and it has been made especially unthinkable, after 1968, by the sociological fable of the 'leisure society', also called 'post-industrial society'. (Stiegler, 2011, p. 4)

If I suggest that the key themes in *The decadence of industrial democracies* are not those of *Technics and time*, it is especially so in that the latter, for all of its fundamental questioning of technology and the human, does not concern itself with, broadly speaking, the cultural and, in particular, with aesthetics. And it is not as if aesthetics is especially addressed in *The decadence of industrial democracies* either, though the question of aesthetics as that which becomes subsumed under a 'culture industry' may well be considered. This is an aesthetics whose production and consumption, emergence and dissemination cannot be dissociated from the most contemporary information and communication technologies, and a culture industry that has a pedagogical, educative and cohering force in normalising regimes of the social. Equally, the normalising techniques of educational practices, their housing and programmes have been developed precisely on these same determinants that construed the production–consumption models of culture industries. Education, in this sense, is a culture industry. Yet, it is Stiegler's *Technics and time: The fault of Epimetheus* that most essentially, though *indirectly*, points to some fundamental considerations of technics, time and aesthetics, or rather recognises how a transformative encounter happens with what might once have been termed 'aesthetics'. In fact, it is curious that Stiegler does not explicitly address the work of art in this volume, as if he, too, was afflicted with the fault of Epimetheus—forgetting. I mention this in particular, as this volume, concerning an essential forgetting, is structured around a 'confrontation' that Stiegler develops between Martin Heidegger's thinking on the essence of technology, in particular Heidegger's understanding of *Gestell*, discussed by Heidegger in 'The question concerning technology' (1977), and three key twentieth-century thinkers of technology and technics, Bertrand Gille, Andre' Leroi-Gourhan and Gilbert Simondon.

On two counts it is surprising that the question of the artwork or poetics does not arise in this text. The most direct one is that it is precisely Heidegger who, in 'The question concerning technology', swings the whole conversation around from a concern with the devastating situation of the 'greatest danger', to be found in the standing reserve of all things for a productionist

metaphysics of ‘challenging forth’ what is, as raw material for production, to a ‘saving power’ to be found in an ontological counter-sway to a ‘bringing-forth’ of what is as *poiesis*, essentially a work of art. Stiegler takes us along the path of Heideggerian thinking on the essence of technology, only to uproot us from this path prior to encountering the radicality of Heidegger’s understanding of the work of art, a radicality that makes a complete break with modernity’s philosophies of aesthetics. One aim of *this* article is to pick up the scent of this path again, while keeping the radicality of Stiegler’s understanding of technics and time in view. The second ‘count’ is, in a sense, the more intriguing one, as it implicates the whole thesis of the book, or at the very least, the originary moment out of which the book emerges. This concerns Plato’s condemnation of the Sophists, thereby establishing the rivalry between *episteme* and *tekhne*. Stiegler reads this rivalry as decisive for Western metaphysics’ determination of the binary and hierarchical difference between natural beings and all that is construction. It opens the radical space for his rethinking of technology and instrumentalism.

For Plato, the Sophists undermined philosophy’s unequivocal determination of truth. For the Sophists, *logos*—language—was rhetoric, an art of speaking in tropes. Argumentation was tropic construction, and hence *tekhne*, and not the exposition of *logos* as true knowledge—*episteme*. Moreover, *episteme* is an end in itself, truth, just as natural beings have immanent to them movement, rest and growth; they, too, are their own ends. *Tekhne*, on the other hand, is not an end in itself, but a know-how for which many different ends are possible. Equally, no construction is an end in itself but a means for an end to be found in a natural being. Technical beings—constructions of all kinds—are means for ends which are not their own. Stiegler does not mention *poiesis* at this point, though could well have mentioned how Platonic philosophy likewise devalued the work of art, as it did *tekhne*, when compared with *episteme*. Stiegler notes:

No form of ‘self-causality’ animates technical beings. Owing to this ontology, the analysis of technics is made in terms of ends and means, which implies necessarily that no dynamic proper belongs to technical beings. Much later [towards the end of the eighteenth century], Lamarck distributes physical bodies into two principal fields: the physiochemistry of inert beings; and secondly, the science of organic beings. ... To these two regions of beings correspond two dynamics: mechanics and biology. Lodged between them, technical beings are nothing but a hybrid, enjoying no more ontological status than they did in ancient philosophy. (Stiegler, 2011, pp. 1–2)

Stiegler’s concern is radical: ‘The object of this work is technics, apprehended as the horizon of all possibility to come and of all possibility of a future’ (ix). For Stiegler, possibility is understood as opening to a futural becoming, hence a temporalizing of temporality. That opening’s coming-into-view, its horizon, is technics. Technics *is* the horizon of temporalizing. But the efficacy of Stiegler’s reference field, commencing with Heidegger, is to develop what is meant by that peculiar ‘object’—technics. Technics is not technology understood as technical objects, nor *tekhne* understood in an ends-means distinction. Nor is technics anthropocentrically determinable. Stiegler understands this in a going-along-with Heidegger’s ‘The question concerning technology’. For Heidegger, the essence of technology is ‘nothing technological’, but rather a mode of revealing how the being of beings is disclosed otherwise than in the beings that are. How are beings disclosed in their being? In the epoch of technicity, as the culmination of Western metaphysics, which from the outset with Plato was productionist-metaphysics, beings are disclosed as a stockpile for production that is for-the-sake-of production itself. Human beings, too, are resources for production. For Heidegger, thinking this from the late 1930s, production is a planetary and systematic framework of ordering beings for production, a framing he terms *Gestell*—‘enframing’, also translated as ‘apparatus’, a systematic *challenging-forth* of what is. Education is to be thought as such a challenging-forth, a stockpiling of resources, human and otherwise for the sake of calculable production, economic ordering, and productive capabilities. Heidegger’s essay of the mid 1930s, ‘The origin of the work of art’ (1993c), concerns the disclosure of artworks conventionally understood as standing reserve for an art industry: ‘Works of art are shipped like coal from the Ruhr and logs from the Black Forest ... Beethoven’s quartets lie in the storerooms of the publishing house like potatoes in a cellar’

(Heidegger, 1993c, p. 145). As such a stockpiling, artworks are discussed as things revealed essentially as equipment, whose essence is reliability: in this sense indistinguishable from technical objects in contexts of an art industry or culture industry. Crucially, for Heidegger, while technical artefacts and a technical apparatus devastate the planet, the essence of technology, revealing the being of these beings, as the revealing of the greatest danger, oblivion of the planet, *as a revealing* also shows, in *Gestell*, the possibility for something other than beings disclosed as stock-piling for production.

While Stiegler does pursue a particularly Heideggerian understanding of temporality, in Heidegger's disclosure of the temporalizing of Dasein, from *Being and Time* (1986), he does not fully pursue Heidegger's thinking on the revealing of the essence of technology, of the saving power and recourse to the work of art. In short, he omits, or forgets to mention the sheer importance of the German poet, Hölderlin, in Heidegger's thinking, and the key role Hölderlin plays in Heidegger developing a transformative understanding of aesthetics as poetics. Instead, Stiegler systematically pursues the work of Gille, Leroi-Gourhan and Simondon, in order to develop more slowly with the successive refinements of their thinking of the object of technics, from Gille to Simondon, a radical encounter with the shifting thinking of ecology in an ever increasing inseparability of thinking *physis*—nature—outside of *tekhne* and thinking *anthropos*—the human—no longer as final cause. In discussing Simondon's understanding of the milieu of technical objects as adaptation and concretization, Stiegler notes:

The technical object submits its 'natural milieu' to reason and naturalizes itself at one and the same time. It becomes concretized by closely conforming to this milieu. This ecological phenomenon may be observed in the informational dimension of present-day technics, where it allows for the development of a generalized performativity (for example in apparatuses of live transmission and of data processing in real time, with the fictive inversions engendered therein)—but it is then essentially the human milieu ... that is found to be incorporated into a process of concretization ... (Stiegler, 1998, p. 80)

Stiegler emphasises that with Simondon, the concretization of technical objects is not a 'humanization of nature', but rather will more readily appear as a 'naturalisation of the human' (81). That is to say, we tend to think of technical objects, as things fabricated by humans as an increasing transformation of nature—what is self engendering—into a humanization. Simondon's radical ecology considers this quite differently. Technics refers to the relational life of technical systems into whose ecology humans are increasingly embedded such that humans are increasingly understood as subjects of or subjected to a lifeworld of technics. In this, Stiegler's aim is to determine a 'saving power' in Heideggerian *Gestell*, not through the counter-sway of *poiesis*, but through a more radical determining of *Gestell*, as the temporalizing of technics. This is no longer humanism, nor even an anthropocentrism. That is, *Gestell* as a revealing of the disclosure of beings as a standing reserve also discloses how time as mediation may be thought differently, opening to Heidegger's concerns with ecstatic temporality. The second half of *Technics and Time* engages technics as that which will be thought along with Jacques Derrida: precisely as the Derridean *gramme*, the object of Derrida's early seminal text *Of grammatology* (1974) which deconstructs the very binary *physis/tekhne* (Stiegler, 1998, pp. 137–142). Stiegler's engagement with technics and temporality opens the possibility for a radical considering of aesthetics and the pedagogical dimensions of aesthetics that would have recourse to neither an instrumentalism nor an anthropomorphism or anthropocentrism, where Kantian aesthetics understood as *mediation* between nature and human freedom will be radically rethought as *immediation*, *immediacy*, which is to say, as the absolute, thought as temporalizing temporality. Just what this infers is now pursued in relation to what Stiegler did not explicitly discuss in *Technics and time*: Heidegger's recourse to the German poet, Friedrich Hölderlin. But in doing so we need to address again the metaphysical distinction Stiegler emphasises between *episteme* and rhetoric or *tekhne* as fabrication.

Trope's Affections

There is an oblique parallel to be drawn between Stiegler's emphasis on Plato's distinction between episteme and rhetoric and a recent book on GWF Hegel, that reads this philosopher of the science of logic somewhat against the grain of orthodox interpretations. Katrina Pahl's *Tropes of transport: Hegel and emotion* (2012), presents Hegelian sophistry, the tropic movements of the Hegelian text whose affective register is no longer the self-identity of a coincident immanent transcendence of an I, but rather an affective emotionality of an impersonal textuality as auto-poiesis (Hegel, 1977). Pahl introduces the *stimmung*—moods—or emotions of love, fear, despair and grief, not in terms of an Hegelian discourse on emotion, which does appear in the Phenomenology, and elsewhere in Hegel's writings, but in terms of what Hegel precisely does not make thematic. Pahl, like Stiegler, engages the rhetorical rather than epistemic structures of Hegel's production, emphasising an affective rather than logical ground. Hegel is transported in the very movements of his textuality by tropic shifts.

However, to recognise precisely such a reading of Hegel, a Hegel between emotion and reason and an 'alternate temporality', requires definitive reference to Hölderlin, the young Hölderlin who was a 'classmate' of both Hegel and Schelling, and who introduced to Hegel the thinking of Heraclitus, a thinking of an essential *polemos*, struggle or strife in all things, that led Hegel to thinking dialectics as such. It is also the Hölderlin whose river hymns, *The Rhine* and *The Ister*, are transporting tropes, concerning a passing through the foreign in a perennially homeless journeying home-wards. These were the themes of lecture courses delivered by Heidegger in 1936 (Heidegger, 2014), and in 1942 (Heidegger, 1996b). Pahl suggests in her doctoral thesis on which her book publication is based:

I locate the origin of speculative logic in the idea of love that Hegel develops in his early fragments. My analysis approaches Hegel's speculative thinking by way of Holderlin's turn to 'conversation' in the poem *Andenken* while discussing Holderlin's term *Andenken* (remembrance) in dialogue with Hegel's notion of *Erinnerung* (recollection). The communication that love affords is also invoked in the confrontation of Hegel's notion of experience with Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment. (Pahl, 2001, p. 2)

Tekhne's Uprootedness

Hölderlin developed a radical reading of Greek cosmology, wherein he saw in the Greeks a new beginning, and it is this new beginning that is the inception for Heideggerian thinking of the essence of technology, and it is this new beginning that Stiegler aims to pronounce in a radical discerning of temporality and technics that fundamentally *absents* the human. Hölderlin emphasises remembrance, recollection and forgetting, the tropic registers by which Stiegler reads the gods, Epimetheus and Prometheus. These references to remembrance and rhetorical fabrication suggest how aesthetic judgement is transformed in and through Stiegler's text, but with an indirection that may well be posing something radical with respect to understanding the work of art in its relation to technical objects. A 'new beginning' refers to Hölderlin's understanding of a radical caesura or break as absence within the ground of human existence. It concerns a radical sense of dwelling and belonging—*autochthony*—and of *ecology* in Stiegler's sense:

Hölderlin's approach to autochthony includes a heightened sensitivity to matters of *terra incognita*, the absence within the ground of human existence. He refuses to absolve the tragic negation of consciousness through the successive steps of a dialectical system, contrary to his friends Schelling and Hegel. Hölderlin would rather preserve the crypt of nothingness by not allowing its abysmal rift to attain closure. He articulates the tragic negation as a caesura, the self-differentiating scission within language itself, which opens into the difference of word, metrical rhythm, even the poet's confrontation with the surrounding world. Caesura becomes most apparent between the heartbeats of poetry, in the silent spaces of the cadence of meter, at its line breaks, and anywhere else in which the 'sign' of poetry equals zero. This 'counter-rhythmic rupture'

demonstrates the power of poetry to preserve difference in suspended equilibrium, without resolving, absolving, or dissolving the negation. (Nichols, 2009, p. 3)

Hölderlin's poetry is violent rupturing *against* the gods' determining powers as the force of nature, where the human is an excessive inwardness, ecstatically uprooting itself from rootedness, perennial dwelling in tropic foreignness, constituting a discordance between nature and freedom marked in the caesura. This tropic poetics is in Stiegler's sense a technics, opposing any totalizing notion of *episteme* as a self-enclosing end. And, yet, this caesura is a dismantling discordance, a rupturing of homeland. Heidegger will come to understand this 'poetically man dwells' in the *polemos* or strife between earth and world, discussed in 'The origin of the work of art', where 'earth' is necessarily encountered in the context of Hölderlin's autochthony, as uprooted rootedness—earth is self-withdrawing jutting into world. Nichols, when discussing Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's *The Ister*, will critique Heidegger for misrecognizing or overvaluing autochthony as rootedness and homeland, as if there is only a narrow preserve between Greek and German, to the exclusion of what was the very passing through of the foreign that constituted Greek soil in the first place (10). Stiegler says something similar concerning Heidegger and autochthony in a long footnote appearing in the second half of *Technics and Time* (Stiegler, 1998, p. 287). As with Nichols, this concern inflects on Heidegger's politics. Where Nichols contrasts Heidegger's discussion of Hölderlin's *Antigone* in his 1935 lectures, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (2000), that emphasises *polemos*, strife and conflict, to his 1942 lectures on *The Ister* that shifts tone to *gelassenheit*, or a letting-be, Stiegler remains focused on the 1935 lectures, though emphasises something essential throughout Heidegger's thinking from *Being and Time* (1996a) to 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' (1993b). Heidegger does not think uprootedness, un-earthing, essentially or primordially as *tekhne*:

[Heidegger] will never have thought time from out of *prometheia*, an absence translated into the conflict that opposed *dike* and *tekhne*. The latter admittedly appears *in* and *as deimon*, but *tekhne* is never considered as the source of un-earthing/making-strange qua good un-earthing, not that of being torn away but that of returning to the most strange, to the most far, which is always the most familiar, concealed by its everydayness. (Stiegler, 1998, p. 287)

But for Heidegger to do so would essentially be to give the name *tekhne* to that strife between earth and world that constitutes 'truth happening in the work': precisely the work of art. And thus, in this sense, Stiegler did not see it necessary to bring Hölderlin's 'saving power' in 'poetically dwelling' into discussion, as already Stiegler, in a radical gesture, figures *tekhne* as coincident with the work of art, as the uprooting from dwelling, from the *oikos* of a *logos* we today name *ecological*, of a human ecology, as the making-strange or most uncanny of what is closest. As Stiegler emphasises, what most needs to be thought 'today more than ever' is that 'originary tension' between the *chthonian* and uprootedness precisely as an articulation between technics and time, 'conceiving technics as the very source of *de-paysement* in the insoluble complexity of its effects' (288).

Though, in his 1941 lecture course, *Basic concepts* (1993a), Heidegger interprets a fragment from the pre-Socratic Anaximander that precisely brings into proximity *dike*, normally translated as 'justice', along with what comes into being and what passes away. The name Heidegger gives to being, radically thought here, is 'enjoining' and to *dike* he gives the translating interpretation 'fit' or need. For what comes into being and for what passes away, both are an enjoining as a bringing forth, unconcealing a being in what it is, its 'fit'. In this sense, we might well ask to what extent can Heideggerian being, as enjoining, be radically thought as *tekhne-poesis*, or more radically, as *physis-tekhne-poesis*? This throws light on the initial premise made at the commencement of this paper, concerning the instrumentalism predominant in the technological drivers of education and questions concerning an activating of an aesthetic sensibility. That 'sensibility' would not be a refusal of technological imperatives nor even a refusal of instrumentalism but rather an unconcealing, in Stiegler's terms, of what is closest as uncanny, uprooting the very familiarity of our everyday. And, in Heidegger's terms, disclosing the ontological dimension of technology as a mode

of revealing and not simply an instrumentalizing means to an end. It is this 'strife' in discerning an ontological difference that opens to the poetic or aesthetic, thinking the being of what is 'fitting' as poetics. We would revise or rethink Kantian aesthetics, or judgements of taste concerning the finality of nature according to, on the one hand, Heideggerian thinking of *dike* as 'fit' in relation to being as enjoining and, on the other hand, in terms of Simondon's thinking of *tekhne*, nature and the human. That *paidos*, the emerging human, essentially the concern of pedagogy, would then be construed according to *logos* thought as unconcealing uprootedness rather than as logic. Our challenge is to recognise a transformative potential for education in such uprooting processes of 'making strange' in what is most familiar and to recognise, with Stiegler and Simondon, the life of technical systems as a radical poetics and radical 'naturalisation of the human'.

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