




A moral community of a realm of ends: Its (im)possibility in education?

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ABSTRACT

When education only is affected by the instrumental principle and its substantiation vis-à-vis specific normative requirements as narratives, practices and traditions of certain kinds, education merely promotes and preserves such normative requirements rather than altering them. I therefore argue that education should not only be affected by the instrumental principle and its substantiation through certain narratives etc. Education should also embrace the value of moving beyond these so that new ways of thinking can be made possible. This it can do when it engages in the creation of a moral community of a realm of ends. However, even though such a creation is possible in principle, it is not necessarily the case that each and every one will engage in making such a moral community possible or that each and every one will be successful in such a pursuit. It is, nonetheless, a worthy quest, and when people engage in creating such a moral community, they strive to set and pursue morally permissible ends in systematic connection, rather than merely external ends valued in specific circumstances. By doing so, they respect each other as ends-in-themselves rather than as means to some further end, or so I argue.

KEYWORDS

Moral community; realm of ends; Immanuel Kant; instrumental reason; normative requirements

Introduction

Some people think that setting and pursuing ends with the necessary means available and the normative requirements for such a thinking is a way of understanding what people do in various situations and why they do it. By ends, I mean, that which people generally try to make possible with the necessary means available. By normative requirements I mean that which substantiates those ends, guides and perhaps even motivates those concerned in their pursuit. I will discuss how the above-mentioned thinking (setting and pursuing ends with the necessary means available) and certain normative requirements are or can be used in understanding the extent to which people in education achieve the required ends with the necessary means available. In our times, for example,

it is not uncommon that normative requirements related to the work market in knowledge-based societies are expressed in terms of becoming, inter alia, employable, flexible and efficacious, and that those related to politics, in particular conservative and totalitarian, are expressed in terms of becoming acquainted with, and submitting to, certain promoted and preserved narratives, traditions, practices, laws and policies within the nation-state; such conditions substantiate the particular ends, guides, etc., and can even motivate those concerned.¹ When this happens, education is used as a means to render those concerned efficacious on the work-market, and make them conform to specific narratives, etc., within a specific nation-state. When education is used in the above-mentioned sense in nation-states, those concerned are prepared for a particular work-market and for becoming more or less loyal citizens in a nation-state, with its particular language(s), history, politics, etc. If, however, education would only be viewed in relation to the above-mentioned ends and normative requirements, it would not necessarily promote and preserve the value of also moving beyond specific substantive normative requirements in education or perhaps even in society at large so that new ways of thinking come about. It may then just be the case that people come to think that things should stand as they are, and that they should submit to the circumstances and do what is required of them, instead of engaging in critically assessing and transforming ways of thinking as well as creating something new and original. I, therefore, argue that the above-mentioned instrumental thinking and normative requirements cannot stand alone. These have to be harmonized with the moral law in Kantian terms, which, inter alia, says that one ought not to use the other as a mere means to some further ends such as becoming efficacious and more or less loyal, but also and always to respect the other as an end in him- or herself. In Kant's words, '*So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*' (2012, 4: 429). A reason for this is that this formula, as a part of the moral law together with the maxims of thinking for oneself, in the position of the other and on the condition that one does this in a consistent way (Kant, 2000, 5: 294-295), demands of those concerned to move beyond that which is known. When they engage in making this possible, then they can set and pursue new ends and pursue the highest good for each and every one or, at least, for as many as possible, and not merely for some in relation to certain substantive ends such as the ones mentioned above. Education in Kantian terms is therefore always an open-ended and a never-ending process, rather than merely a means to some specific substantive ends. I argue, therefore, that even though it is not unreasonable for the upcoming generations to be prepared as a workforce through education, or that they should become acquainted with promoted and preserved narratives, etc., education can and should do more. It should also make it possible for those concerned to create a moral community of a realm of ends. This means that those concerned conceive of themselves as 'a whole of all ends (of rational beings as ends in themselves, as well as the ends of its own that each of them may set for itself) in systematic connection' (Kant, 2012, 4: 433). Such a systematic connection of ends entails that each and every one should be free to choose moral permissible ends, that is, ends which are implied by the moral law. Education should, therefore, not merely confer value on those concerned as means to some further end, it should also and always confer value on them as ends-in-themselves, with the capacity to think for themselves, etc. Education can, then, contribute to the creation of a moral community in which those concerned pursue the highest good as far as possible for as many as possible. The highest end for education should therefore always be moral perfection [see, for example, Kant (1997b, 27: 471) and Kant (1996a, 6: 386-388)]. Kant believed, however, that such an achievement is not easy 'because one cannot expect to reach the goal by the free agreement of *individuals*, but only by a progressive organization of citizens of the earth into and toward the species as a system that is cosmopolitically united' (Kant, 2006, p. 238), namely, a system of a realm of ends. Kant (1998b) continues:

Now, here we have a duty *sui generis*, not of human beings toward human beings but of the human race toward itself. For every species of rational beings is objectively – in the idea of reason – destined to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good as a good common to all. But, since this highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person for his own moral perfection but requires rather a union of such persons into a

whole toward that very end, [that is] toward a system of well-disposed human beings in which, and through the unity of which alone, the highest moral good can come to pass, yet the idea of such a whole, as a universal republic based on the laws of virtue, differs entirely from all moral laws (which concern what we know to reside within our power), for it is the idea of working toward a whole of which we cannot know whether as a whole it is also in our power. (6: 97-98)

We, therefore, have a duty to make such an orientation possible, according to Kant. Otherwise, we would just fall down in the abyss of dark waters, in which we become the plaything of forces beyond our control; when this happens, we downgrade ourselves to passive, reactive beings, and do not take our responsibility to become active by using our reason and understanding, which we ought to do. Instead of falling down, we should take our responsibility to persevere in becoming both efficacious and autonomous in education and society at large, thereby making ourselves worthy of happiness. Education or society at large should, then, not hinder those concerned from rendering themselves in the above-mentioned sense. It is, however, not necessarily the case that education (or societies at large) throughout the world makes it possible for those concerned to render themselves in the above-mentioned sense in a consistent manner.

Part I

Apart from understanding and using education in the above-mentioned and narrow sense,² in terms of efficacy and submission, instead of efficacy and autonomy, it has also become more common in present times to evaluate the extent to which education achieves the required ends through internal and external evaluations, that is, either through evaluations done by the nation-state, or by transnational institutions in terms of the PISA-programme (Programme for International Student Assessment), and TIMSS (Trends in International Mathematics Science Study), which in turn reinforces the demand of becoming efficacious and competitive in relation to what the global standards require. And when education does not in-itself enable those concerned to pursue or achieve the suggested aims, it should become compensatory, which means that education should help children and young people with their deficiencies so that they are better off to pursue the required aims.³ When it comes to the above-mentioned aims, and when it is seen in the light of more or less conservative politics or totalitarianism and the extent to which these are in force, it is not uncommon that such politics demands of those concerned to submit to language(s), history, etc., which are or should be promoted and preserved in the nation-state; such forces do not, however, necessarily render them autonomous, critical and creative in education or society at large, which I argue is essential to meet and respond to, real-life challenges. When people are not rendered in the latter sense, they become reactive rather than active; that is, when only the above-mentioned moral requirements—*efficacy* and *submission*—make claims on those concerned, the latter have a tendency to adjust to the moral requirements in the mandatory ways, rather than experiencing joy and happiness in relation to the affirmation of creativity; people can experience joy and happiness when creating something new and original in, for example, science, philosophy and art. However, when people merely become adjusted to the above-mentioned normative requirements, they will not necessarily use their reason to think for themselves, from the viewpoint of the other (or do so in a consistent way, as far as possible), nor will they necessarily engage in becoming critical and creative, nor find a value in becoming in such ways. Becoming active means then that those concerned do not merely or only understand the moral requirements in a specific society; they also engage in moving beyond them and in finding their way anew by actively using their reason, understanding and imagination. When doing so, they take themselves seriously and want to get things right. Harry Frankfurt (2006), for example, writes:

We want our thoughts, our feelings, our choices, and our behavior to make sense. We are not satisfied to think that our ideas are formed haphazardly, or that our actions are driven by transient and opaque impulses or by mindless decisions. We need to direct ourselves – or at any rate to *believe* that we are directing ourselves – in thoughtful conformity to stable and appropriate norms. We want to get things right. (p. 2)

Taking ourselves seriously and getting things right means then that we strive to become active or that we at least come to believe that we are acting under the idea that we are directing ourselves. In turn, this means that we engage in creating a gap between specific substantive ends set within, for example, a nation-state and morally permissible ends. We can then dissociate ourselves from the former and comply with the moral law. We thereby engage in moving ourselves, that is, rendering ourselves active, instead of being acted upon by others, or in the words of Frankfurt (2006):

What counts is our current effort to define and to manage ourselves, and not the story of how we came to be in the situation with which we are now attempting to cope. (p. 7)

Apart from understanding and coping with the situation in which we (come to) find ourselves, we, or at least some of us, also want to become, and do become, active. We become so when we value our freedom to go against certain hindrances as well as our freedom to set and pursue those ends which are compatible with the freedom of any other to set and pursue their own ends. It means, moreover, that we really take our responsibility to maintain a 'harmonious accord between what we do and what we want [and ought] to do' (Frankfurt, 2006, p. 14), instead of merely submitting to specific substantive ends required in a society, unless these also entail that people have the right to engage in directing themselves to ends which are implied by the moral law.

Part II

Now, even if the normative requirements mentioned above are the ones that more or less govern the moral conduct of people, and a fair amount of them do become efficacious on the work-market and submit to the promoted and preserved traditions, etc., it does not necessarily mean that each and every one of them truly become efficacious, etc. A reason for this is that human beings also have a tendency to persist in more comprehensive ways, that is, as beings who can render themselves not just efficacious, etc., but also critical and creative. Another reason is that people deviate from becoming either efficacious and loyal or efficacious, critical and creative; more on this below. They can when they engage in the former participate in finding their way again, instead of merely complying with specific substantive moral requirements in the circumstances in which they are or become apart.⁴ Efficacy and submission alone as normative requirements could, therefore, obscure the idea of what people 'really' ought to do, and how they can get things right, since these are not the only ones that can guide and motivate people. When people comply with the former, they come to combine certain beliefs and values in the mandatory ways. That is, they become guided by the 'right' reasons, according to the suggested moral requirements. Such persons can then become the slaves of the suggested normative claims, or as Stanley Cavell (1990) writes: 'the slaves of [their] slavishness' (p. 47). It may, then, even be the case that when they act under the influence of that which is needed or demanded of them, they are or can be seen as people who have the right beliefs and values, and who have the right combination of them. They are, or can then also be, seen as people who are motivated by the right way of becoming in relation to the mandatory moral requirements. Otherwise, they would not be valued members of such a society; they may then even be seen as a threat or as irrational or as people who are in need of help of some sort; it might even be the case that they are not welcome in the society, or at worst even terminated, as in the case of the Holocaust.

A problem with the above-mentioned assumption that persons act merely under the influence of the specific substantive normative requirements such as efficacy and submission is that they may identify themselves with the specific normative requirements within a society and (come to) think that these are what they 'really' ought to pursue. However, when they only submit to such normative requirements, they do not merely diminish their freedom, they even (come to) deceive themselves and think that there is no other way. Hence, when merely the above-mentioned and substantive requirements motivate those concerned, it comes with a price, namely, that they are or come to understand themselves merely as a means to some further end, and not as ends in themselves. It may then even happen that they come to view not merely themselves, but also others, in such terms.

Further, it is because of our self-consciousness and capacity for self-reflection that we can come to understand specific moral requirements and the effects of them. We are, therefore, unique in the sense that we seem to be able to think about what concerns us and that we can confer a value not merely on specific substantive ends, but also on ourselves, and that we have a particular authority and responsibility to respect the other and ourselves as ends in ourselves. Our self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reflection in combination with the moral law do not, then, merely remind us, but also demand of us, that we have a moral obligation to humanity in us. This, in turn, suggests that we conceive of us as creatures who can set and pursue morally permissible ends in systematic connection. Such a moral community of a realm of ends requires that each and every one should not merely confer value on specific substantiated ends, but also, and in particular, on others and themselves as ends in themselves, which implies that they ought to engage in becoming critical and creative. This further suggests that human beings should set and pursue those ends which are compatible with the freedom of any other to set and pursue their own ends. When they do so, it also demands of them to promote their own moral and natural perfection and the happiness of others (see Kant, 1996a, 6: 386), on the one hand, and create conditions that makes it possible in education and elsewhere in society at large, on the other.

Part III

Still, even though human beings as rational beings are self-conscious and can comply with the moral law, it does not necessarily mean that each and every one will take upon themselves to promote the duties mentioned above. This is because people do give in to their impulses and have a tendency to submit to the circumstances that affect them. When this happens, people weaken their freedom and diminish themselves as authors of their own actions. They then just set and pursue the required ends that are determined by someone else, perhaps because they then have the experience of becoming recognized by others as mere means to some further end, rather than not being recognized at all—not even by themselves, or because they have some bodily desires being satisfied, or both. They would then, according to Christine Korsgaard (1996): ‘no longer be able to think of [themselves] under the description under which [they] value [themselves] and find [their] life to be worth living and [their] actions to be worth undertaking’ (p. 102), namely, as *efficacious* and *autonomous* beings. They become instead the plaything of forces beyond their control; they might even come to believe that this is how things should be, not just for themselves, but also for others. However, our thinking, for Kant (2000), does not just work alone to set, pursue and realize ends through understanding, it can also work together with reason and imagination. When this happens, it is possible to go beyond specific substantive ends and their normative requirements so that new ends can be created and pursued. It is, therefore, not merely the experience of happiness in relation to others’ recognition of oneself or the satisfaction of bodily desires that are of value for Kant; of value is also the experience of happiness in the free play of imagination and understanding so that something new and original can be made possible.

An education worthy of its name, should, therefore, for Kant, make room for the experience of criticality apart from creativity; engaging in cultivating one’s capacities for critical thinking and creativity can, however, also lead to bad experiences, in particular when reactions are strong, perhaps even threatening to such an engagement. Nonetheless, even though such experiences are possible and actual, Kant believed that we should not allow ourselves to be dragged down by specific normative requirements. We should instead engage in abstracting ‘from all hindrances to morality in it (weakness or impurity of human nature)’ (Kant, 1998a, A808/B836), and engage in critical activities concerning, inter alia, normative requirements as well as in creating new ends. Kant also warns us that, if we would not engage in such activities, we would blindly ‘accede to every demand the government puts forth as necessary for administering the state’ (Kant, 1996a, 6: 322). When this happens, we corrupt ourselves and become the slaves of such demands, instead of

resisting them when required. Our thinking and reason do not, however, have to be the slave of these demands. It can and ought instead to be free from such hindrances. Kant (1998a) writes:

The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be able to express his reservations, indeed even his *veto*, without holding back. (A739/B767)

Any strong demand of normative requirements related to the instrumental principle, therefore, has to be depoliticized, according to Kant, and there has to be room for morality. He writes: ‘all politics must bend its knee before’ rights and morality (Kant, 1996b, 8: 380), so that politics and morality are negotiated, and that morality hopefully can ‘shine unfailingly’ (Kant, 1996b, 8: 380). Such a negotiation does not, however, come easily; nor is it the case that morality can come forth without hindrances, at least not completely. Consequently, it is hard work for human beings to create a moral community with a realm of ends insofar as they engage in actively harmonizing them into a system mutually and reciprocally. Such an endeavor requires of those concerned that they actively engage in ‘realizing each other’s ends in a common effort’ (Van Impe, 2013, p. 696), apart from giving equal weight to and promoting the morally permissible ends of each and every one. It suggests, moreover, that a moral community of a realm of ends is a normative construct, which not only is a ‘theoretical idea for explaining what exists ... [but it is also] a practical idea for the sake of bringing about—in conformity with precisely this very idea—what does not exist but can become actual by means of our behavior’ (Kant, 2012, 4: 436, footnote). In the moral community, people do not, then, just act in agreement with the moral law, they also consider themselves ‘as those who give laws’ (Kant, 1997a, 29: 629), that is, as those who give themselves the moral law. This means that they act in accordance with and are motivated by the moral law, and not merely by specific normative requirements in a society. And, by complying with the moral law, people engage in critically assessing the ends set within a specific society. Hence, as rational beings we should not merely render ourselves efficacious on the work-market or submit to other specific normative requirements in specific nation-states; we should also, and in particular, render ourselves critical and creative, and thereby affirm the possibility and experience of joy and happiness when becoming creative. When engaging in the above-mentioned activities, we do not merely depart from the normative requirements in specific societies; we also unify ourselves as members of a moral community, and when we do so, we also make ourselves worthy of happiness. That is, we make our ends the happiness of the other and the perfection of ourselves as our duties; the latter consists, for Kant, in respect and love for the cultivation of ‘one’s *faculties* (or natural predispositions), the highest of which is *understanding*’ (Kant, 1996a, 6: 387). And when it comes to the former—happiness—it is not just about satisfying the natural inclinations and desires of the other, or of oneself, or of each other; it is also, and in particular, about making it possible to experience happiness through the use of reason, understanding and imagination; and when this happens people show respect and love of each other, and they engage in helping each other to promote ‘the *capacity* to realize all sorts of possible ends, so far as this is to be found in a human being himself’ (Kant, 1996a, 6: 392). They, moreover, engage in refraining, in the words of Allen W. Wood (2008),

from setting all ends that oppose the obligatory end – specifically, any end of *decreasing* one’s own perfection (or doing anything that makes you less worthy of your humanity), or making the unhappiness of any person your end (as happens in the “vices of hatred”: envy, ingratitude, and malice). (p. 168)

Wood continues:

We thus have a perfect duty to avoid any action that involves these forbidden ends, and also a narrow duty or perfect duty to perform any action whose nonperformance would amount to the principled reunification of [morally permissible ends]. (p. 168)

The ends mentioned earlier—efficacy and submission—should therefore be harmonized with the cultivation of people’s critical capacity and creativity as morally permissible ends. Such duties are, however, perfect or wide, which determine us to have these as our ends (and not merely the ones

discussed above) and leave us with a latitude, or playroom, ‘regarding how far we promote the obligatory ends and which actions we take toward them’ (Wood, 2008, p. 169). However, even though we ought to have these duties as our ends, we do not have a duty to maximize them for each and every one. It is only said that we should not refrain from having them as our ends, or doing anything that goes against such ends. It is, however, meritorious to make such actions possible, and it is not necessarily blameworthy if people fail to do them, unless they proceed ‘from a refusal to adopt the kind of end at all’ (Wood, 2008, p. 169), that is, from a refusal to promote all those ends which are compatible with the freedom of any other to set and pursue their own ends; such a refusal appears, however, widely throughout the world, or so it seems.

Part IV

If people, then, do refuse to promote ‘the *capacity* to realize all sorts of possible ends, so far as this is to be found in the human being himself’, it is, according to Kant, blameworthy. Otherwise, it is meritorious, that is, when people actually do promote a moral world of a realm of ends. How, then, does it come about that people choose not to promote ‘the *capacity* to realize all sorts of possible ends’? Wood, through Kant, argues that the real source of resistance to promote the above in our societies in which we are disciplined and civilized, but not necessarily moralized, ‘is our propensity to unsociable sociability in the social condition’ (Wood, 2008, p. 161), that is, our ‘propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society’ (Kant, 2009, p. 13). Wood (2008) continues:

The irony of our fate is that the very historical conditions for developing our capacity for moral reason—which tells us that all rational beings are of equal (absolute) worth and that we ought to follow a moral law that brings all their ends into systematic harmony—are also conditions in which our empirical desires, as they are freely taken up by us in exercising our rational predisposition to humanity, naturally pressure us to behave contrary to that law of reason. As social (and especially civilized) creatures, therefore, we have a corrupt need to think better of ourselves than we do of others, and our natural impulses all cater to our self-conceit. (p. 161)

Such an unflattering picture of us can, nonetheless, draw our attention to what human beings are capable of, and which appears in the ‘multitude of woeful examples that the experience of human *deeds* parades before us’ (Kant, 1998b, 6: 33). The unappealing picture can also be used to make us think about whether our social and historical conditions hinder or promote that which we ought to do, that is, promote the happiness of the other and the perfection of ourselves—as far as it is possible. It may also help us to move away from our naivety, perhaps even our tendency to irrational action in general, perhaps not completely, but occasionally so that we can ‘combine our ends into a whole under the name of happiness’ (Wood, 2009, p. 115). Such an engagement suggests not only that we confer value on us as self-conscious beings, but also on us as beings with the capacity to think about what we possibly can pursue when we act in agreement with, and are motivated by, the moral law. When we do this, we may also engage in acknowledging and responding to any of that which hinders us, not just outside of us in society, but also through our tendency to self-conceit, that is, our tendency to think better of ourselves than of any other. Kant (1998b) writes about such tendencies that these,

can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is physical and yet *involves comparison* (for which reason is required); that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself to be happy or unhappy [and Kant continues:] Out of this self-love originates the inclination *to gain worth in the opinion of others*, originally, of course, merely *equal worth*: not allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant anxiety that others might be striving for ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others. (6: 27)

Not only do such expressions of self-love fuel jealousy and rivalry, but they also fuel ‘*envy, ingratitude, joy in others’ misfortunes*’ (Kant, 1998b, 6: 27). Moreover, our propensity to have the

principle of self-love override the moral law, which may be supported by policy and politics in a society, can also drive us away from seeing what actually is possible. For, it is possible that we can act upon the idea of freedom and comply with the moral law so that we can affirm joy and happiness, instead of all that which encourages us to go in the opposite direction. But this requires that we promote the happiness of the other and the perfection of ourselves as far as possible, and that we create conditions in our societies that enable us to do so in terms of a moral community of a realm of ends. We are, however, not there yet. Will we ever be? It does not seem that human beings will achieve such a moral community throughout the world against the tendency of human beings to create the woeful examples of deviations. It is nevertheless worthy to pursue, and when we engage in making it happen, which is hard work, we can experience not merely the possibility of a realm of ends, but also its realization on occasion, which reminds us of what we can do, without forgetting the darkness that lingers within and outside us, and which drags us down in the abyss of dark waters.

Concluding remarks

If, then, self-consciousness, as the source of normativity, and we, as beings of self-reflection, can create a gap between that which affects us, and what we through reason and understanding can come to comprehend (and we through imagination can imagine what we possibly can do), we face a choice that resides within and between us, and which we cannot avoid. Hence, we are condemned with free choice. We should therefore take ourselves seriously and do what is right. And if we actually do take ourselves seriously, we have to take our responsibility to govern ourselves, and not just become the slave of our circumstances or our passions. We should, then, choose those ends, which are compatible with the freedom of any other to set and pursue their own ends with the necessary means available, that is, morally permissible ends, instead of merely submitting to specific substantive and normative requirements in specific societies. The highest end for human beings should therefore always be moral perfection. Education plays, here, and by implication, a major role. Kant asks: 'How then, are we to seek this perfection, and from whence is it to be hope for? [And his answer is:] From nowhere else but education' (Kant, 1997b, 27: 471). Education should, therefore, not merely be conditioned by the moral requirements—efficacy and submission—in specific societies. It should also, and in particular, make it possible for those concerned to pursue moral perfection—as far as possible. We should therefore care about this moral obligation, and when we do, we come to stand in a special relation not merely to ourselves, but also to others, namely, a relation in which we are concerned about the happiness of the other, and care for the perfection of ourselves. We, then, engage in going against anything that hinders our freedom in education and society at large when striving to make a moral community of a realm of ends in and through education possible, which is hard work. However, even though people strive to make such an endeavor possible, it cannot be granted that there will be no deviations. Nonetheless, and here I agree with Moses Mendelsohn, it happens that 'a dot blazes up in the midst of the great mass, [and] becomes a glittering star' (Mendelsohn, 1983, p. 97), almost regardless of limiting conditions in specific societies.

Notes

1. Roger Scruton—a defender of conservatism—claims, for example, that people belong to 'some continuing, and pre-existing social order, and that this fact [according to him] is all-important in determining what to do' (2001, p. 10) in specific circumstances. He also claims that the 'conservative attitude demands the persistence of a civil order' (2001, p. 17), and that the 'process whereby human beings acquire their freedom also builds their attachments, and the institutions of law, education and politics are part of this' (2014, p. 119). Scruton even argues that in order to become or 'develop fully as persons ... [people have to engage in the path of self-development] in which imitation, obedience, and self-control are necessary moments' (2017, p. 111-112), but not necessarily critical thinking and the

engagement in creating something new and original. He further claims that: 'Education, and the accretions of tradition which surround it, [therefore] provide their own direct picture of a human aim', and that 'conservatives should fight to preserve private schools. For they have provided examples of what education really is, and it is by following such examples that the state schools can lift themselves from the sink of mediocrity' (2001, p. 134-137). There is, however, nothing that convincingly shows that private schools are better than state schools in each and every case in making it possible for those concerned to perfect themselves morally, nor that state governed schools necessarily would make it possible in each and every case. So, we see that Scruton thinks that people ought to conform and subordinate themselves to certain normative requirements in specific societies, but not that they should engage in altering them when needed, nor that they should learn to do so in education or in society at large. And when it comes to totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt (1976) forcefully argues that '[i]ntellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiative is dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political opposition' (p. 339). Arendt continues: 'Total domination does not allow for free initiative in any field of life, for any activity that is not entirely predictable. Totalitarianism in power [therefore and] invariably replaces all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty' (p. 339). Hence, neither conservatism nor totalitarianism necessarily make it possible to go beyond existing social orders and specific narratives. These traditions do not, therefore, necessarily support the idea of pursuing morally permissible ends or a moral community of a realm of ends.

2. See Roth (2012) in which the author critiques the above-mentioned ends of education, and Roth (2010) in which the author critiques instrumental reasoning in education; see also Hardarson (2012; 2017) for similar discussions. Nowadays, education is in principle for all, but this has not always been the case. Education had typically been for a few young men during antiquity and a long time after. However, even though more people have been able to attain education throughout the world, the issue of what ends and with what means still captures the minds of people. But what ends should education pursue, and with what means? In antiquity, Plato thought that the highest end is the world of ideas and in particular the idea of the good, and that education should be the means through which those concerned ought to be able to enter into the world of ideas, and attain the idea of the good. Plato believed that those who enter into the world of ideas and come to know the idea of the good should be the ones that ought to govern society, namely, the philosophers; others would be either guardians or workers. Aristotle disagreed with Plato, and argued that the highest good is not attainable in a world of ideas, but in practice. Hence, he thought that education should make it possible for those concerned to become virtuous and build a strong character in education and society at large in practice, and not by entering a world of ideas. Education, for Aristotle, should therefore provide opportunities for those concerned to cultivate their theoretical, practical and technical capacities, in particular their practical judgment in practice so that they can make legitimate moral judgments in the situations they are in. However, even though Plato and Aristotle believed that normative requirements should not merely be identified with the idea of preparing people as a workforce, they thought of education in terms of means and ends, and they believed that education should be only for a few. It was not until later that philosophers came to think that education should be for most if not all, at least in principle. John Dewey, for example, thought that each and every one should be educated to grow as human beings, in particular as moral beings. Others, like Baruch Spinoza, Moses Mendelssohn and Immanuel Kant, also thought that people should be educated as moral beings, but neither believed that each and every one would become good persons through education, as in the case of Dewey. Mendelssohn (1983), for example, writes: '[Y]ou will find no steady progress in ... [the] development [of the human species] that brings it ever closer to perfection' (p. 96), nor back to the promised land. Despite the lack of such experiences, it happens, according to him, that 'a dot blazes up in the midst of the great mass, [and] becomes a glittering star' (p. 97). And Spinoza (1988) writes in the end of his *Ethics* that 'If the way I have shown to lead to these things now seems very hard, still, can be found. And of course, what is found so rarely must be hard. For if salvation were at hand, and could be found without great effort, how could nearly everyone neglect it? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare' (E5p42s25). Kant, too, thought that people deviate from doing good, and that some deceive others and make them believe that they want to do good, when they are just exploiting them for their own interest; he also referred to the experience that yet others will terminate the other in particular when the other is of no use or believed to be a threat to themselves. Hence, not everyone will necessarily become moral, according to him.
3. Deficiencies are in present times not uncommonly viewed in the light of *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-5). However, the idea of mental disorders has to be scrutinized continuously and challenged in particular since nontypical behavior does not necessarily mean or suggest

that it is a deficiency or a mental disorder in relation to that which is viewed as typical; DSM-5 may just exemplify human beings' tendency to express criteria for who belongs and who does not belong to a certain group, and what it means to belong and not to belong, and not much other than that.

4. It is, however, not easy to render those concerned efficacious and loyal. The character of work, for example, changes over time and varies among and within nation-states throughout the world—it can be characterized, for instance, by agriculture, industrial production, knowledge-based production, and nowadays by influences of artificial intelligence. It is therefore a challenge to prepare the upcoming generation to become efficacious on the work-market since the character of work changes not just within a nation-state, but on the various work-markets in the world. Moreover, it is also a challenge to render the upcoming generations loyal to narratives, traditions and practices within a nation-state, since such an aim does not necessarily equip those concerned, as citizens of the world, with the capacity to respect the other as an end in him- or herself, that is, as members of a union of realms of ends.

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