Do dialogic teaching models always guarantee empowering the student’s voice in classroom dialogue?

Do dialogic teaching models always guarantee empowering the student’s voice in classroom dialogue?

Mark Debono

Department of Systems of Knowledge, University of Malta Junior College, Msida, Malta

Abstract

This paper challenges the prevailing assumption that dialogic teaching models always guarantee empowering the student’s voice. It shows that the strict adherence of classroom dialogue to the model’s protocol may inhibit the unique expression of students. In the first section, I discuss the aspect that every classroom dialogue is different from the other and, as such, cannot always be perceived as being produced solely from the parameters of dialogic teaching models. To substantiate this argument, I employ Derrida’s analysis of the example as a force that consistently exceeds the boundaries of the exemplary. The second section deals with the issue of how a classroom dialogue can effectively empower the student’s voice using a critical appropriation of the paradigmatic conditions of dialogic teaching. Drawing on Derrida’s concept of ethical responsibility as a process resulting from how we use something for a specific purpose, I point out that adoption and adaptation allow us to be more creative in our use of the protocols of dialogic teaching models for classroom dialogue. The concluding remarks again indicate the complexities of balancing pedagogical strategies between the hegemonic structuring of classroom dialogue from dialogic teaching models and the organic development of students’ voices.

Keywords

dialogic teaching models; classroom dialogue; transformative learning; exemplary and example; Jacques Derrida

Introduction

Dialogic teaching, a concept that has gained trust over the last few decades, emerged as a response to the binary opposition between the “Teacher-Centred Paradigm and [the] Learning-Centred Paradigm” (McManus, 2018, p. 423). This shift in education’s strategy from an instructional model to a dialogical one facilitated the engagement between teacher and student in teaching and learning. This factor fostered a fairer educational setting. Different philosophical and educational ideas of thinkers like Socrates, James Dewey, George Herbert Mead, Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Lev Vygotsky, Jürgen Habermas, Paolo Freire, and Michael Oakeshott have been analysed by numerous scholars to develop dialogic teaching models.

Rather than building on the existing assumptions that predominantly emphasise the norm that when classroom dialogue stems from dialogic teaching models it always empowers the student’s voice, this paper shows that strict adherence to the models’ protocols can inhibit students’ unique expression. I argue that dialogic teaching models are value-neutral, thus allowing room to discuss how classroom dialogue can be developed beyond the models’ authoritative framework. The multifaceted nature of pedagogical processes will always reveal how limited our actions can be when we follow only the normative expectations of dialogic teaching models. Marianna Papastephanou remarks that the reduction of the ‘semantic content of normativity to prescription and programmes of actions […] disconnect[s] evaluation and normativity to confine the latter to narrow norm-following, normalization and prescriptivism’ (2021a, p. 3). In this sense, this paper reassesses our application of the norm of dialogic teaching models to classroom dialogue.

In line with the above arguments, in the first section of this paper, I discuss the aspect that every classroom dialogue is different from the other and, as such, cannot always be perceived as being produced solely from the parameters of dialogic teaching models. To substantiate this argument, I employ Derrida’s analysis of the example as a force that consistently exceeds the boundaries of the exemplary. The second section deals with the issue of how a classroom dialogue can effectively empower the student’s voice using a critical appropriation of the paradigmatic conditions of dialogic teaching. Drawing on Derrida’s concept of ethical responsibility as a process resulting from how we use something for a specific purpose, I point out that adoption and adaptation allow us to be more creative in our use of the protocols of dialogic teaching models for classroom dialogue. The concluding remarks again indicate the complexities of balancing pedagogical strategies between the hegemonic structuring of classroom dialogue from dialogic teaching models and the organic development of students’ voices.

On the relation between the exemplary of dialogic teaching and the example of classroom dialogue

As a preliminary introduction to this section, I identify Eugene Matusov’s distinction between the monophonic and polyphonic approaches to dialogue as essential to my discussion about the limits associated with applying dialogic teaching models to classroom dialogue. For Matusov, the monophonic approach, which means ‘one voice’, is instrumental. In this approach, “dialogue can help improve instruction and learning. Dialogue is an instructional strategy and a method of teaching – a classroom discussion or debate – that can make learning more effective and even raise test scores” (Matusov, 2009, p. 75). The polyphonic approach to dialogue contrasts the monophonic as its meaning reflects ‘many voices’, what Matusov calls ‘dialogism’. In this approach, the ‘teacher has to epistemologically re-learn the subject with the student with an uncertain and unforeseen outcome of this learning’ (Matusov, 2009, p.107). Matusov continues to explain this factor by claiming that in “the genuine dialogue, there is no epistemological authority who “knows more” apriori, and that is why something is true. The truth has to be (re-)created in a dialogue each time with an uncertain outcome, or it stops being the truth” (2009, p. 107). The latter polyphonic approach, the one which invites us to see dialogue beyond instructional motivations, allows us to frame the capacities of dialogic teaching in what Robin Alexander calls an objective that “enact[s] the larger aims for which, at best, education claims to stand” (2018, p. 592).

Alexander, like Matusov, remarks that the broader framework of education must exceed the instructional purposes of dialogue. Along the same lines, I ask whether classroom dialogue becomes more instructional and instrumental when it works only on the strict conditions of the dialogic teaching model. The failure to lodge classroom dialogue within a broader framework that exceeds the conditions of dialogic teaching can bring about severe limitations. Alexander warns us that when this happens, we will conduct the classroom dialogue by a “reductionist corollary of ‘what works’” (2018, p. 592). For classroom dialogue to remain focused on the objective of education, it must avoid limiting its aims to those set by the dialogic teaching model.

To provide a clearer understanding of the specific reduction examined in this paper, it is essential first to indicate the critical distinction between the theoretical framework and the conditions of the dialogic teaching model. This point makes us ask two research questions: (1) Are we looking at the model of dialogic teaching as providing us with the theoretical framework for classroom dialogue? (2) Or are we looking merely at the conditions of the model of dialogic teaching as a method that explains how we shall proceed in classroom dialogue? I refer to Thomas C. Walker’s investigation of the difference between theory and method to answer these two questions. For him:

…[m]ethods provide procedures and techniques of investigation. Theory, on the other hand, conceptualizes and defines the subject to be investigated. The theory provides a representation of the world and helps identify a range of possibilities within that world. In other words, a theoretical framework leads the researcher to certain important questions, while a method -whether it be a formal deductive model or a historical case study-provides a way of answering those questions. (Walker, 2010, p. 444-445)

Without undermining the dialogic teaching model’s theoretical relevance for classroom dialogue, in this paper, I seek to focus more on the second question, where the conditions of dialogic teaching generate the ‘method’ for classroom dialogue. Specifically, I investigate whether the development of classroom dialogue on the method set by the dialogic teaching model produces a uniform learning environment, reminding us of Matusov’s earlier point about the monophonic approach of dialogue, which makes a class with ‘one’ voice.

When we examine what happens when the dialogic teaching model, by its method, standardises classroom dialogue, we see a replication process. To problematise this excessive similarity between the dialogic teaching model and classroom dialogue, I introduce Jacques Derrida’s interpretation of the relationship between the general traits of the exemplary and the unique aspects of the example. In his discussion, Derrida shows us that the exchange between the exemplary and the example is more nuanced. Unlike the straightforward approach, which sees the example as an exact representation of the exemplary, Derrida contends that the exemplary always contaminates the example and vice versa. Due to this constant interaction, the equation between the exemplary and the example is more complex because it is always indeterminate. No one can exactly know with certainty the result that develops from the exchange between the exemplary and the example. In one of his passages from his text, Glas, Derrida tells us that this indeterminacy becomes more evident when we realise that the exemplary can never manifest itself fully in one example and that no one example can ever fully represent it. On this issue, Derrida writes the following:

…(The uniqueness of the example is destroyed by itself, immediately elaborates the power of a generalizing organ), the very moment we would claim to recapture there, in a determined text, the work of an idiom, bound to a chain of proper names and singular empirical-signifying configurations, glas also names classification, that is, inscription in networks of generalities interlaced to infinity, in genealogies of a structure such that the crossings, couplings, switchings [aiguillages], detours, and branchings never simply come under [relèvent…d’] a semantic or formal law. (1986a, p. 149b)

For Derrida, the constant interaction between the exemplary and the example keeps generating different directions on how they connect. Jakub Màcha explains the connection between the exemplary and the example as a multifaceted phenomenon. He tells us that on:

…the one hand, this means that any example is in part already an exemplar or points towards an exemplar. On the other hand, the approximation of the exemplar by a series of examples has no clear sense of closure. This means that every exemplar is, in part, an example. (Màcha, 2020, p. 72)

The arguments posited by Derrida and Màcha bring to light the relevant point about the investigation of this paper, namely, that as such, there can never be one exemplary of dialogic teaching and one example of classroom dialogue. Instead, we find a plurality of examples of classroom dialogue representing exemplary dialogic teaching, which reveals that the connection between the two is more fluid. Angelo Condello remarks that the many directions between the exemplary and the example reflect the dynamic interplay between the two notions. She suggests that the connection between the exemplary and the example is more circular. This circularity serves to sustain an open relationship between the two. She claims that:

…it is in the process of questioning the boundary of normativity in a specific moment and context that the instance becomes the exemplary case through a circular process that goes from the particular to the exemplary and that because of its dynamic circularity continuously shows that the exemplum remains also the whatever case. However, is it the whatever case by not being any longer the whatever case: the elements of whateverness are lost in the passage from the particular to the exemplary. The process, the passage particular–exemplary, is where the normativity of exemplarity has its foundation. (Condello, 2018, p. 440-441)

Through the above passage, Condello shows us that the interaction between the example and the exemplary consists of an intercepting process, which sees the example passing beyond the point of its specific condition to reach its abstraction in the model and vice-versa. In her argument about the example’s grounding by Derrida, Irene Harvey notes that the example also has a stationary aspect. She remarks that the:

…role of example-as-anchor,as opposed to at-sea, one might claim, would seem to stop the movement of the demonstration, to paralyze it where it stands, to prevent it, in short, from functioning as a demonstration-of-something. Yet the anchoring also can be seen as grounding, touching, a foundation that being the basis of movement,and its condition of possibility is itself immobile. (Harvey, 2002, p. 187)

As Harvey shows in her passage, grounding carries two implications. Firstly, the grounding moment of the example, like the anchoring of a ship at sea, prevents it from moving forward, impeding its full demonstration. In this sense, the exemplary can never be revealed without fully demonstrating the example.

Applying the above arguments to the discussion of our paper, we find that when we try to anchor the example of classroom dialogue, we become more aware of its paradoxical nature. The example’s position as fixed and changing at the same time continues to prove that, as such, no one instance can exactly mirror the exemplary of dialogic teaching. This point shows us that when the classroom dialogue is temporarily lodged, we need to find that engaging space where the unique contribution of teachers and students is recognised. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we remain fixed on this experience. On the contrary, we have to move to find other examples of classroom dialogue. This factor, whether we remain fixed to a standard classroom dialogue or whether we keep seeking other examples, depends a lot on the way we appropriate the dialogic teaching model.

The following section deals with the topic of appropriation. It will be argued that a critical and responsible appropriation of the dialogic teaching model reflects how we handle its example(s). This aspect is also invariably connected with how we treat others. In other words, we have to reflect on whether classroom dialogue serves as a platform that silences or empowers the distinctive contribution of both teachers and students.

On the responsible use of the dialogic teaching model for classroom dialogue

In this section, I will focus on the responsibility associated with how we use the conditions of the dialogic teaching model for classroom dialogue. In this regard, two alternative directions can be followed. One can either replicate the conditions of the dialogic teaching model in classroom dialogue or instead deviate from their determining trajectory, opening new possibilities for engaging in more meaningful classroom dialogue. Yusef Waghid warns us that when we are conditioned, in this case by the conditions of exemplary dialogic teaching, the classroom dialogue between teachers and students will appear as:

…certain and framed by absolute understandings of knowledge and events in the world. What comes to mind immediately is the notion that pedagogical encounters should not be hierarchical in the sense that teachers and students should embark on some predetermined path in order to come to an understanding. (2014, p. 65)

A hierarchical application of the conditions of the dialogic teaching model is tied to our responsibility towards others. It reflects the ethical consideration of whether we ought to maintain the privilege of using models for teaching and learning purposes while potentially risking the suppression of the unique voices of teachers and students in dialogue.

To delve deeper into the above issue, I will examine Derrida’s argument about responsibility. Derrida positions responsibility in an aporetic region, where, on one side, we glimpse excessive loyalty towards tradition; on the other, we seek to move beyond such excess to explore new territories. In his Other Heading, Derrida writes that the “condition possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention” (1992b, 41). Suppose we apply this aporetic understanding of responsibility to our discussion in this paper about how we use the conditions of the dialogic teaching model. In that case, we find out that our responsibility consists of showing some loyalty to the conditions of the model but also learning to venture into new areas of dialogical encounters beyond those stipulated by the conditions. By simply preserving the repetition of the conditions of the dialogic teaching model in classroom dialogue, we will risk denying the students the ability to express their unique contributions. Without such novel participation, classroom dialogue ends up having no different future. It is not an easy task for classroom dialogue to take a different route than the prescribed one, for such endeavour “also demands reinterpretation, critique, displacement, that is, an active intervention so that a transformation worthy of the name might take place: so that something might happen, an event, some history [de l’histoire], an unforeseeable future-to-come” (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 4).

Applying the above argument to pedagogy, we realise that teaching and learning cannot be reduced to transmitting knowledge in a compliance framework, where the end of the objective of classroom dialogue is always predictable. An active intervention by teachers and students in classroom dialogue implies that both sides arrive at a point where the advancement of dialogue cannot be perceived in advance. This factor continues to support the argument that, as such, we can never have one exceptional classroom dialogue but a plurality of examples. This happens because, in every classroom, dialogue takes place in a “specific moment and context” (Condello 2018, p. 440). The unique contributions of teachers and students that develop in classroom dialogue will always differ from other instances.

Without a plurality of different trajectories in classroom dialogue, we risk reducing everything to mere “mechanistic affirmation” (Diprose, 2006, p. 442). The more we involve ourselves in this risk of experimenting with new trajectories in classroom dialogue, the more we understand the transformative elements of “responsibility [as] stretched between self-responsibility and responsibility or the other, therefore involving the same self-critique and critique of concepts that characterise the aporetic structure of inheritance” (Diprose, 2006, p. 440). Without such critique of the hegemonic points that reduce classroom dialogue to a mechanical exercise, we will keep repeating the same conditions of the dialogic teaching model through and through.

Our classroom dialogue, rather than appearing determined to move across the step-by-step procedure of the model, should look more puzzling. Neil Mercer’s remark is apt at this point, for he says that:

…[t]he basis of common knowledge upon which shared understanding depends is constantly being developed as participants in a continuing conversation interact. The nature of the shared knowledge being invoked in any dialogue is therefore potentially quite complex. It is in a state of flux, as immediate shared experiences and corresponding conversation. (2008, p, 44)

While recognising other examples of classroom dialogue that illustrate this ongoing conversation, I will limit my analysis to the case of Philip Bernhardt. In his class, Bernhardt allowed students to express themselves and talk about the significance of their autobiography. From this experiment, he discovers that the plurality of the unique contributions by students reflect the point that “[a]utobiographical narratives create new possibilities for engaging students in the learning process and serve as a rich context for self-inquiry, historical connection, and the development of personal relationships” (Bernhardt, 2009, p. 67).

These various reflections show that beyond the stipulated conditions of the dialogic model, students can produce a classroom dialogue where they can make a self-critical reflection that allows them to question their history and relationships with others. This factor has also motivated Bernhardt to produce a self-critique about himself as a teacher. As he comments, such plurality of student voices in classroom dialogue also provided:

…valuable opportunities for self-reflection about my role as a teacher, my pedagogical intentions, and how my teaching practices shape and influence the learning process. Creating a curricular space which values and embraces student voice, encourages an ethic of care and understanding between students, and embodies both the lived and living experiences seems like, from the standpoint of a teacher, a valuable endeavor. (Bernhardt, 2009, p. 67)

Bernhardt broadens the scope of the uniqueness of classroom dialogue, for he sees the process of motivating a plurality of students’ voices as also connected to an ‘ethic of care’, that responsibility to be attentive to the different expressions of others. This argument turns out to be crucial for the argument of this paper, for our attention to how the voice of the students develops in classroom dialogue also reflects whether we are only attentive to the format of dialogue as stipulated by dialogic teaching models or else, we seek to shift our attention on introducing spontaneous elements in dialogue. This is why Bernhardt points out that such a feat is open-ended, and he says that it is full of “uncertainties”. The way classroom dialogue develops remains uncertain because we can never be sure about the course the voices of teachers and students take and whether such course always reflects the care for each other. Amy L. Boelé, while referring to the works of Dewey, Freire, and Habermas, explains that what increases or decreases this element of uncertainty depends on our perception of classroom dialogue. For her, classroom dialogue has to be lodged in that:

…space in which mutual understanding is achieved through listening, reasoning, and encompassing multiple contested view-points as a forum for learning is an idea taken up by political, legal, philosophical, and educational theorists alike (Dewey, 1966; Freire, 1970; Habermas, 1990). Dialogue can become the tool for democratic participation, liberation, and education. Yet dialogue is more than its forms. Conversations shape and are shaped by the situations, institutions, and social structures that contextualize the interaction. (Boelé, 2018, p. 72)

The plurality of voices in classroom dialogue shows us that learning can happen beyond the objectives of dialogic teaching models and even beyond the classroom. As Papastephanou remarks, “[p]ersons become constructed by all that surrounds them” (2021b, p. 19). She uses this claim to theorise that a conception of learning alternative to the modern one may treat “learning as diversified and inclusive of anamorphic possibilities throughout a person’s life, in tensed company with others and in a complex engagement with the world” (2021b, p. 25). Like the camera’s anamorphic lens in cinema, which reshapes the images of the natural world, anamorphic learning allows individuals to reshape their thinking while interacting with others and the world. For Papastephanou, anamorphic learning also needs:

…a periagogic eye. [This] is a skilled eye, though not in the conventional sense of “skill”. Its skill is owed to one’s having learnt to move one’s gaze in different directions, to let the eye wander (peri-agogē, roaming) and be fixed or averted there where things attract re-view, re-vision, or abandonment of a fixation. (2021b, p. 23)

This ability of individuals to reshape their thinking while their eyes roam about in ‘different directions’ allows one to develop a rich interpretive level. Classroom dialogue, not so much conditioned by dialogic teaching models, facilitates a multifaceted look that brings deeper interpretation and more meaning to our actions. In the following section, I will elaborate on how interpretation, transformation, and wonder play a significant role in transformative learning as an approach that motivates teachers and students to think and act differently.

Broadening the boundaries of dialogic teaching models: An exploration of ‘transformative learning’ within classroom dialogue

In this section, I will explore how ‘transformative learning’ can enable us to go beyond the rigid adherence to dialogic teaching models. This move has the potential to produce a classroom dialogue that encourages change through a critical evaluation of the prevailing assumptions of knowledge. This line of thinking is grounded in Jack Mezirow’s definition of ‘transformative learning’ as ‘the social process of construing and appropriating a new or revised interpretation of the meaning of one’s experience as a guide to action’ (1994, p. 222-223). In other words, a classroom dialogue that develops with less influence from the dialogic teaching models can allow students to move beyond the explanation stage (the interpretive level) and explore how they can bring about a marked change (the transformative level). The latter includes a theoretical reflection and thinking about the best action to change reality.

This level of change that occurs through one’s actions shows that classroom dialogue cannot be perceived only as a means that empowers the student’s voice but also as that interaction which brings about action. In this scenario, classroom dialogue is perceived as a:

…classroom activity [that] is turned into a political setting for transformation when dialogues acquire value and are turned into new forms for acting in the world. They become political once students learn about the power they have to take decisions and think about the ways they learn and reasons for learning what they are learning. This becomes transformative once they become more critical about the ways they will engage in society. (Liberali, 2017, p. 68)

As Liberali claims in the passage above, classroom dialogue empowers students’ self-expression on an interpretative level and leads them to transform their actions. What is interesting is that Michael Christie et al. debate whether Mezirow’s interpretation of transformative learning can be actualised in real life. Christie et al. perceive ‘transformative learning’ as:

…another term for independent thought. It helps us critique our own thought processes, our points of view and the fields that shaped them, whether they are family, friends, fashion, the media, academic disciplines, educational institutions, church or state. Transformative learning adds value to other types of organised learning by helping us to regularly re-assess the validity of our learning and enables us to apply what we learn in unexpected situations. (2015, p. 22)

Applying our learning in a transformative way in known and unknown circumstances is challenging for teachers and students. This shows us that learning results from negotiating knowledge about what is known and unknown. At this stage, classroom dialogue makes students more aware that learning consists of a constant openness to a plurality of interpretations, various decisions and actions. More than this, we also realise that in certain situations, we rationalise the best-transforming action or that, at times, these same transforming actions prove futile. Rather than being discouraged from such an appearance of a ‘void’, we become more aware of the subtle lesson that a degree of unknowingness is also vital for strengthening our sense of wonder in our teaching, learning, and lives.

Here, Anders Schinkel et al. (2023) argue that wonder cannot be perceived as an isolated phenomenon but as connected to human flourishing, which is also one of the essential elements of education. In their paper, Schinke et al. differentiate between inquisitive and deep or contemplative wonder:

Inquisitive wonder, as the word suggests, refers to a more inquisitive or exploratory attitude; it combines the receptivity that characterises all experiences of wonder with the activity of seeking explanations and understanding. This is often referred to in the literature as wondering about. This wonder is more closely related to curiosity and is therefore more easily linked to education and learning than contemplative wonder. Contemplative wonder (wonder at) refers to a predominantly receptive response to its object. It is a quiet response to mystery; though it may involve a play of the imagination there is no focused search for an answer, it does not immediately translate into (explorative) action. This type of wonder is therefore closer to awe than to curiosity. (2023, p. 149)

The above passage suggests that wonder, encompassing curiosity and awe, is a powerful motivator for ongoing learning and exploration. While the curious side prompts continual questioning, the stage of awe seeks to pause from active questioning to appreciate things without explaining what is happening. These considerations lead us to question whether the navigation of classroom dialogue beyond the established conditions of dialogic teaching models can facilitate an experience of learning that brings curiosity and awe to students.

In the following concluding remarks, I will show how the role of the educator as a ‘mediator’ can be more appropriate for steering classroom dialogue in the direction where teaching and learning, using curiosity and awe, provoke students to remain unsettled in their exploration for reflection and transformative actions.

Conclusion: The educator as a ‘mediator’ of ‘transformative learning’ in classroom dialogue

In this paper, I have emphasised that the pedagogical process is situated within a liminal space. On the one hand, the performance of classroom dialogue reveals our fidelity to dialogic teaching models. Conversely, classroom dialogue aims to develop dialogic encounters on lines different from the conditions of dialogic teaching models. Mainly, the critique addresses the lack of equilibrium in classroom dialogue resulting from the excessive determining influence of the prerequisites of dialogic teaching models. Hence, students must be constantly encouraged to perceive classroom dialogue as an opportunity for continual discovery. In this pedagogical scenario, we are prompted to seek alternative dialogic teaching practices rather than adhering to the given conditions of dialogic teaching models. Dialogic teaching and learning must have an opening where students can:

…articulate what they know and position them to have interpretive authority. There is purposeful negotiation of the discourse of ‘everyday’ knowledge that students bring with them to school, and then when students are readied, there is connection to the discourse of formal education, ‘school’ knowledge. (Boyd & Markarian, 2011, p. 519).

This ‘interpretative authority’ empowers students to negotiate critically with their teaching and learning process. If, on the contrary, as educators, we adhere only to the conditions of dialogic teaching models during classroom dialogue, we will risk assuming a role like that of an ‘usher’, where we position students in pre-booked spaces.

The metaphor of the ‘usher’ is adopted from Jürgen Habermas’ essay ‘Philosophy as Stand-In Interpreter’ to critique the authoritative setting by Immanuel Kant, where the foundational role of philosophy advanced the direction of the other sciences in a determined way. To address this imbalance, Habermas remarks that philosophy is to be “well advised to withdraw from the problematic roles of usher (Platzanweiser) and judge, can and ought to retain its claim to reason, provided it is content to play the more modest roles of stand-in (Platzhalter) and interpreter” (1999, p. 4). This passage shows that philosophy is more effective for Habermas when it mediates with the other sciences instead of taking a judgemental role. Returning to our discussion, we ask, ‘What happens to classroom dialogue when the educator assumes the mediator role rather than the “usher”?’ One plausible answer is that when educators distance themselves from the rigid conditions of dialogic teaching models, they can be perceived as ‘mediators’ who motivate ‘transformative learning’ in their classroom dialogue. This opportunity allows both teachers and students to realise the transformative qualities of the teaching and learning experience.

The performance of classroom dialogue always remains problematic as it requires a balance between the conditions of dialogic teaching models and the potential emergence of unknown factors when we move beyond the stipulated conditions. We cannot have a definite answer about which conditions sufficiently make up the best dialogic teaching model or which example of classroom dialogue is the most adequate to represent the model. When working with dialogic teaching models, we must attribute a marginal role to their conditions rather than a central one. This marginalisation cultivates a heterogeneous classroom environment that welcomes the idea that teaching and learning consist of a plurality of voices. Through this plurality, we may become more aware of the transformative elements of the pedagogical process, ones which express themselves in terms of a “language of opening and undergoing [one which] is more helpful than that of mastery and accomplishment” (O’Donnell, 2013, p. 278). I call the ‘opening’ from the strict adherence to the protocols of dialogic teaching models a ‘pedagogical space’ in classroom dialogue that considers the plurality of the distinct voices of students and teachers. This task is difficult as it requires that we take intermittent pauses from the rules of dialogic teaching models in a manner that allows adaptations to prevailing conditions. This novel approach to classroom dialogue reveals again the complexities we face in balancing the normative, prescriptive framework of dialogic teaching models and the organic development of the voices of teachers and students.

Additional notes

The list of thinkers in the first paragraph of the introduction was retrieved from the chapter Wegerif R. (2019) “Dialogic Education” in the Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Education. In this chapter, Wegerif provides insight into how various thinkers have shaped our understanding of the main characteristics of dialogic education. In addition to Wegerif, I recognise the contributions of other scholars, such as Robin Alexander. Their works have addressed the challenges of developing effective dialogic teaching models

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Professor Marianna Papastephanou from the Department of Education, University of Cyprus, for inviting me to present the initial concepts of this paper at the ‘Tilos International Conference of Education’ in July 2024. I also want to thank Dr Nick Peim and Dr Darren Webb for their valuable feedback on various ideas in this paper.

Disclosure statement

The author reported no potential conflict of interest.

Notes on contributor

Mark Debono is a Senior Lecturer II of Systems of Knowledge at the University of Malta Junior College. He earned a doctorate in pedagogical sciences: theory and philosophy of education from the University of Cyprus. His research and publications address various educational limits, like the difference between transmissive and participatory pedagogies.

ORCID

Mark Debono https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2246-1110

References

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